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ABSTRACT 
We have developed metrics of the performance and operational impacts 
of METOC support to strike operations conducted on operational U.S. Navy 
aircraft carriers (CVs).  Our goal was to assess that support and make 
recommendations for improving it.  We adapted an existing automated real time 
METOC metrics system, which was developed for land based training missions, 
for use on CVs by developing a new data collection form, new metrics, and new 
collection, analysis, and reporting architecture for the remote entering of sensitive 
mission data without compromise.  The weather support element of a CV, the OA 
division, does not provide strike mission planning support, but does provide 
situational awareness to pilots.  Our system allows that situational awareness to 
be measured and assessed using metrics that quantify the performance of the 
forecasts, the relationship of the forecasts to the mitigating actions taken by pilots 
due to adverse weather conditions, and the effects of individual weather 
phenomena on the execution of strike missions.  A key element of the data 
collection, analysis, and reporting system developed in this study is the collection 
of METOC related data from pilots during their intelligence debriefings.  This 
system is readily adaptable for the assessment of METOC support to other 
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GLOSSARY OF SPECIAL TERMS USED IN THIS STUDY 
Bias:  Bias is a forecast performance metric that compares forecasted 
severe negative weather conditions to observed severe negative weather 
conditions to determine if is the conditions are being over or under forecasted.  
Bias uses the following calculation based on the standard contingency table: 
Bias 100 A C
A B
+= × +  
False alarm rate (FAR):  FAR is a forecast performance metric that 
measures the rate at which incorrect forecasts are issued by comparing incorrect 
forecasts of severe negative weather conditions to the total number of forecasts 
of these conditions.  FAR is determined using the following calculation based on 
the standard contingency table: 
   FAR 100 C
A C
= × +  
Forecast accuracy (FAC):  FAC is a forecast performance metric that 
measures the rate at which correct forecasts are issued by comparing correct 
forecasts to the total number of forecasts.  FAC is determined using the following 
calculation based on the standard contingency table: 
FAC 100 A D
A B C D
+= × + + +  
Metrics:  Quantitative measures of variables and their relationships with 
each other that are critical in assessing the performance of an operation or 
organization.  Example: FAC is a metric of the performance of forecasts and of 
the METOC units that generate those forecasts.   
Missions canceled:  An operational impacts metric equal to the 
percentage of total missions that were cancelled due to severe negative weather 
impacts.  This metric is a subset of missions requiring mitigation that specifically 
 xviii
shows which missions were unable to complete their primary objective due to 
severe negative weather impacts. 
Mission canceling phenomena:  An individual negatively impacting 
phenomena metric equal to the percentage of missions that were cancelled due 
to an individual weather phenomenon.  This metric is useful in determining which 
phenomena have large operational impacts and are therefore especially 
important to correctly forecast.    
Mission impacting phenomena:  An individual negatively impacting 
phenomena metric equal to the percentage of mission impacts that were due to 
an individual weather phenomenon.  This metric is useful in determining which 
phenomena have large operational impacts and are therefore especially 
important to correctly forecast.    
Missions placed at risk:  An operational impacts metric equal to the 
percentage of total missions flown for which the pilots encountered a severe 
negative weather impact.   
Missions requiring mitigation:  An operational impacts metric equal to 
the percentage of missions that encountered a severe negative weather impact 
and for which the pilots took mitigating action.  This metric helps distinguish the 
mission that encountered adverse weather conditions and were able to take 
mitigating action from those that encountered adverse weather conditions but 
could not take mitigating action.    
Mitigation rate:  An operational impacts metric equal to percentage of 
total missions requiring a mitigating action by the pilot.  This metric gives an 
overall picture of the extent to which weather impacts operations. 
Mitigated received negative:  An operational impacts metric equal to the 
number of missions with a correctly forecasted severe negative weather impact 
and a mitigating action taken by the pilot divided by total number of missions 
forecasted to have severe negative weather impacts.   
 xix
OA Division:  Designation for the division on a ship, if so equipped, that is 
responsible for providing METOC support.  The “O” designates the operations 
Department and the “A” designates the Aerography Division. 
Probability of detection (POD):  POD is a forecast performance metric 
equal to the number of times a given type of severe negative weather impact was 
correctly forecasted divided by the number of times that impact was predicted.  
POD is determined using the following calculation based on the standard 
contingency table:    
POD 100 A
A B
= × +  
Received negative:  An operational impacts metric equal to the number 
of missions forecasted to have a severe impact divided by the total number of 
missions.   
Situational awareness (SA):  SA is the understanding prior to mission 
execution of the actual and potential, and the controllable and uncontrollable, 
aspects of a mission.  Pilots with SA are better able to prepare mitigation and 
contingency actions in the event that the mission cannot proceed flawlessly or as 
planned. 
Targets changed:  An operational impacts metric equal to the percentage 
of total missions for which the target was changed due to severe negative 
weather impacts.  This metric is a subset of missions requiring mitigation that 
specifically shows which missions required a target change due to severe 
impacts. 
Target changing phenomena:  An individual negatively impacting 
phenomena metric equal to the percentage of missions for which an individual 
negatively impacting phenomenon led to a target change.  This metric is useful in 
determining the phenomena that, from the perspective of the end user, are most 
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A metrics program involves objectively measuring and evaluating an 
organization’s critical variables, and their relationships to each other, to help in 
assessing and improving the organization’s products and services.  Metrics can 
be applied to assessing the Navy meteorology and oceanography (METOC) 
community’s support of strike warfare by measuring the accuracy of METOC 
products provided in support of strike warfare and the operational impacts of 
those products on strike warfare.  A standard set of Navy METOC community 
metrics will help rate the forecasting skill of the community and of its individual 
units, it will track the value of the community to the war fighter, and it will assist 
war fighters in their mission planning.   
We have conducted a research, development, and transition study to help 
lay the foundation for a METOC metrics program.  This study is part of a long line 
of closely related METOC metrics studies conducted at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) during the last six years.  This study had three main goals.  The 
first goal was to adapt the metrics collection and analysis system developed by 
Butler (2005) for use in assessing operational strike warfare support and for 
eventual use across a broad range of warfare types.  The second goal was to 
implement our adapted system on an operational CV.  The third goal was to 
conduct an initial evaluation of the accuracy of METOC products provided in 
support of strike warfare and the operational impacts of those products on strike 
warfare. 
2. Data and Methods 
We focused our metrics development efforts on: (a) the relatively short 
term mission execution weather forecasts provided to pilots by the OA divisions 
on the USS Enterprise, USS Eisenhower, and USS Stennis; and (b) the actions 
taken by those pilots in response to severe negative weather impacts.  Pilots are 
 xxiv
the main customer of the OA division on an aircraft carrier.  They receive a 
forecast from the OA division that provides them with situational awareness of 
the weather expected during the mission.  We were able to measure the 
accuracy of the flight path weather forecasts and to infer their value to the pilots’ 
situational awareness during mission execution.   
The data collected for this project had to be relevant to missions flown by 
strike aircraft and had to be observable by the pilots.  In discussions with 
members of SGOT Norfolk we decided to collect forecast and observational data 
for general aviation and weapons impacts for the launch, transit, refueling, over 
target, and recovery phases of the missions.  This is the data that is routinely 
provided by OA divisions to pilots for individual missions, so collecting this data 
did not impose much burden on the division.   
 One of our main challenges was that standard meteorological data for 
verifying mission forecasts is generally not available, except at the carrier.  This 
meant we needed to rely on the pilots for their assessments of the conditions 
they experienced during their missions.  In addition, we also had to rely on them 
to provide us with data on the actions they took to mitigate severe negative 
weather impacts.  Prior studies in which METOC personnel have attempted to 
collect such METOC and operational data from pilots have shown that it can be 
very difficult get pilot cooperation.  So we needed to develop a method for 
collecting enough data to accurately describe what happened in the environment 
but not so much that we would lose the cooperation of the pilots.  We settled on 
an approach for collecting pilot data that was based on three main questions:  
1. Were any inconsistencies between weather that impacted the mission 
and weather in the mission execution forecast? 
2. What, if any, part of the mission was negatively impacted by weather?  
3. What if any mitigating actions were taken due to adverse weather 
conditions? 
 xxv
OA division personnel obtained the answers to these basic questions mainly by 
sitting in on intelligence debriefings of the pilots, supplemented by follow-up 
questions if needed.  The answers to these questions provided us with the data 
we needed without asking pilots to recount specific meteorological values, and 
while imposing little or no extra work on the pilots. . 
The majority of our metrics calculations are based on a contingency table 
similar to the one in Figure 1.  This contingency table allows for easy 





Severe Impact No  
Severe Impact 
Total 












Total A+C B+D A+B+C+D 
 
Figure 1.   Contingency table.  Forecasts are organized into one of four categories 
in the table, A-D.  Each category corresponds to one the four possible 
combinations of forecasted conditions and observed conditions.  
 
The four categories of the contingency table we used were based on our interest 
in assessing forecasts of severe negative weather conditions, the forecasts that 
prior studies have shown are especially challenging for forecasters, and 
especially important to war fighters (e.g., Jarry 2005).  The four categories are: A: 
severe impact forecast and observed; B: severe impact not forecasted but 
observed; C: severe impact forecasted but not observed; and D: severe impact 
not forecasted and not observed.  We determined whether forecasts and 
observations represented severe impacts by comparing them to published 
weather related thresholds for different strike mission air frames, weapons, 
sensors, etc.  A severe weather impact threshold represents the conditions 
beyond which successful mission completion is very doubtful.  By comparing the 
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number of forecasts in each category to each other and to the total number of 
forecasts, forecast performance metrics can be directly calculated, and other 
types of operational impact and weather phenomena metrics can be determined.   
We calculated three types of metrics: forecast performance metrics, 
operational impacts metrics, and impacting phenomena metrics.  The forecast 
performance metrics were calculations based only on the standard contingency 
table in Figure 1 and were used to describe the performance of the forecasters in 
predicting events that would have resulted in significant impacts to operations.  
Operational impacts metrics represent how the forecast for the mission affected 
operations.  Finally, we used impacting phenomena metrics to describe how 
individual weather phenomena impacted missions.  An example of the output 
from a performance metric calculation showing probability of detection (POD) can 





Figure 2.   Example of POD metric output based on test data analyzed.  Each bar 
indicates the POD for 13 different weather phenomena types and for all 
mission phases.  Results based on classified real world data are similar.    
 
We developed our data collection, analysis, and report system on the 
internet to allow for easy development of the system by civilian contractors.  We 
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then moved the system to the NPS SIPRNet server for further testing and 
operational use by the OA divisions.  We implemented the system on the 
SIPRNet to ensure protection of sensitive mission data and to allow maximum 
accessibility to aircraft carriers at sea.  We propose that our system eventually be 
transferred to an operational METOC center (e.g., FNMOC).  Due to the Navy’s 
IT requirements, current hosting of the system is limited to NPS and FNMOC 
because these locations have developmental systems that can host the open 
source PHP and PostgreSQL software used in our system. 
3. Results 
Designing and developing our system involved three main steps.  The first 
step was to design a set of questions on a paper form that could be put through a 
trial with an OA division to experiment with content and wording.  The second 
step was to develop the user interface seen in Figures 3 and 4 for entering the 
collected data into a database.  The final step was to test the, collection, 
analysis, and reporting functions of the web based system using real world 








Figure 3.   The online data collection form, similar to the paper data collection 
form.  The online form was designed to be easy to use by having the 
same questions as the paper form in the same physical location.  The 
form also hides the individual weather impact fields until the user needs 




Figure 4.   Expanded weather impact field from the online data collection form.  
The check boxes are in the same layout as the paper form to allow for 
easy transfer of information. 
 
These steps were accomplished with the assistance of the USS Enterprise OA 
division over a period of 2 months and resulted in the following lessons learned: 
• Detailed understanding of both the METOC support process and the 
war fighter process is necessary to properly design the data collection 
portion of the system.  In this study, we found that the CAOC, not the 
carrier OA division, is the provider of METOC support during mission 
planning.  To fully track the impact of weather forecasts on missions, 
data from the CAOC must also be collected and analyzed.   
• The shipboard METOC personnel have limited options for mitigation 
recommendations.  Pilots have limited options for mitigating action. 
• SIPRNet connectivity is not as reliable as we had hoped. 
• PostgreSQL was too slow on the metrics calculations; PHP is a better 
choice for the calculation task. 
• Collection of data from pilots was not as difficult as we had anticipated. 
After the initial trials, we collected data from USS Enterprise for a short at-
sea period, and then introduced the system to personnel on USS Eisenhower 
and USS Stennis.  Due to the short data collection period, we were only able to 
perform preliminary assessments of the performance and operational impacts of 
the OA divisions’ forecasts.  These results show FAC for all forecasts of 99%, 
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POD for severe negative weather conditions of 40%, and mitigation rate of 14%.  
These results are very similar to those obtained in closely related studies by Hinz 
(2004), Jarry (2005), and Darnell (2006).   
4. Recommendations and Future Work 
The next step in our METOC metrics for strike warfare program will be to 
transfer our system to the Naval Oceanography Enterprise for continued hosting 
and maintenance.  Hosting the interface and database at an operational 
command will ensure continued data collection and encourage accrual of a more 
complete dataset that will accurately provide robust assessments of the quality of 
the support that the Navy METOC community gives to operational units.  
Our metrics system was developed using a bottom-up approach. Our 
development of the system was encouraged by CNMOC, but its design was 
dictated by those who will use the system and those who will analyze the results.  
With the conclusion of this study there is now an extensive set of METOC metrics 
concepts and tools methods suitable for assessing METOC support for a wide 
range of warfare areas.  Thus, METOC metrics research and development have 
reached a point where many METOC Units can participate, especially in routine 
data collection.  We recommend that this be mandated and financially supported 
by the leadership of the METOC enterprise.   
Resource shortages are rapidly pushing the METOC community toward 
an automated and integrated forecast creation and verification system, including 
a weather briefing generator, a forecast verification module, and a metrics 
module that tracks forecasts and mitigating actions during both mission planning 
and mission execution.  The implementation of our data collection, analysis, and 
reporting system is an important step towards this larger goal.   
Future work should extend our metrics system to incorporate both the 
planning and execution portions of the mission, including implementation of the 
system in the CAOC.  This future work must collect metrics data from earlier in 
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the planning process to better understand how planning forecasts impact mission 
generation, ATO creation, and, ultimately, mission success. 
Future work should also extend this system to incorporate automatic 
capture of forecast data from a brief generator tool.  Likewise, pulling observation 
data from existing automated sources should be pursued to make the observed 
weather data collection invisible to the pilot and the OA division.  As much as 
possible, we should strive to make data collection a constant background 
process, so that we can get on to the business of putting the metrics to work to 



























A. OVERVIEW  
Corporations have developed quantitative analysis tools to identify how 
they can make their processes more efficient.  These tools help them improve 
production numbers, cost-ratios, and ultimately, the bottom line by evaluating 
specific parameters of their operations processes and making targeted 
improvements.  These tools developed by civilian industry are applied to 
individual processes to quantify their value to the company.  Processes that 
demonstrate poor efficiency can be retooled, improved, or eliminated to save 
costs.  The quantitative assessments that result of measuring and evaluating 
specific parameters, and quantifying the parameters’ impact on end processes, 
are referred to as performance metrics, or simply metrics.  This is the basic 
definition we will use when referring to metrics, and in this study we will apply 
these business-oriented ideas to measure specific parts of the U.S. Navy’s strike 
warfare process. 
With shrinking budgets and ever mounting criticism of government 
spending, the concept of improving process efficiency has found its way into the 
federal budget.  The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007 
has outlined a metrics related initiative started in 2004 called the Program 
Assessment Rating Tool (PART) (Executive 2006).  In defining PART, the 
FY2007 Budget document said: 
The PART helps assess the management and performance of 
individual programs.  With the PART, agencies and [Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB)] evaluate a program’s purpose, 
design, planning, management, results, and accountability to 
determine its overall effectiveness.  Recommendations are then 
made to improve program results. 
PART encompasses most programs in the executive branch of the Federal 
Government, including the Department of Defense.  Because of this, the concept 
of applying metrics to evaluate programs extends down to the Navy and the 
Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC) community within the Navy.  The 
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Assistant Secretary of the Navy in a memo to the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) stated “The [Department of the Navy (DoN)] must establish performance 
metrics that correctly reflect management and funding priorities … 
Recommended metrics beyond those proposed in [the listing of proposed DoN 
metrics] are encouraged.  For optimal effect, metrics proposed by the DoN 
should be those most meaningful to each of you in monitoring and assessing 
performance in each of your functional areas of responsibility.” (Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (ASECNAV) 2002) 
 LCDR Jake Hinz, while a master’s candidate at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS), noted that the Commander, Naval Meteorology and 
Oceanography Command (CNMOC) had been unsuccessfully trying to measure 
the METOC community’s value to the Navy for over 10 years.  CNMOC’s failures 
at previous metric efforts were traced back to a poor definition of metrics and 
attempts to link METOC support to operational customers through links that are 
“ill defined, too complex or do not exist at all” (Hinz 2004).  Hinz (2004) set out to 
develop a prototype metrics system for the METOC community based on those 
developed by the National Weather Service (NWS).  The NWS metrics program 
was chosen as a model due to the NWS’s similarity to the Navy METOC 
program.  Both groups are government run weather services, and consequently 
have similar measurable processes.  The NWS metrics process is based on 
metrics of success recognized by the end users of NWS products (e.g., 
emergency managers who rely on NWS products, such as tornado warnings).   
For these metrics, NWS identifies a goal (e.g., improved tornado warning lead 
times) and then measures how NWS forecasters are doing in achieving that goal 
(Hinz 2004).  Hinz went on to define metrics: 
Performance measurement is the term used by OMB to describe 
the key processes used by the NWS and other agencies to 
measure their results based on previous performance baselines, 
projected goals, and the current status of management efforts to 
reach those goals.  The quantitative results of these processes are 
called performance metrics.  These metrics are then applied in 
management level decision making. 
3 
The system Hinz (2004) created, referred to as the NPS Metric Method, was 
used to provide information to CNMOC on the performance of their forecasters 
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and contributions the forecast made to 
the planning and execution of combat missions.  His system was based on one 
developed by the National Weather Service (NWS) and was adapted for use in 
tracking Navy weather forecasts through the use and development of 
performance metrics.  His use of performance metrics, metrics that measure the 
performance of a forecaster’s ability, laid the ground work for calculating how the 
forecaster’s performance affected operations conducted by the Navy. 
 The Federal Government PART initiative has also resulted in a similar 
effort towards metrics by the Air Force.  The Air Force metrics program is 
governed by Air Force Instruction 15-114, Functional Resource and Weather 
Technical Performance Evaluation 2001.  This instruction outlines a metrics 
program with the goal of understanding the overall effectiveness and value of the 
Air Force weather system at all levels of supported operations.  The program has 
outlined that mission execution forecasts, terminal aerodrome forecasts, and 
warnings should all be verified and the results tracked.  Captain Jeff Jarry in 
2005 and Major Karen Darnell in 2006 both did metrics studies, reviewed later in 
this chapter, that concentrated on the verification and tracking of mission 
execution forecasts while they both were students at NPS (Jarry 2005, Darnell 
2006).   
1. METOC Community Metrics 
Due to the requirements imposed throughout the Federal Government and 
the Department of Defense (DOD) by the PART system, the Navy has a need for 
a fleet wide metrics program.  The ability of the fleet to deploy and fulfill its duty is 
now tracked with the Ship Depot Maintenance metric which measures 
quantifiable elements of the ship’s maintenance programs (DoN 2005).  The 
Navy’s tobacco cessation program is even tracked with metrics (Long 2003). The 
METOC community has also found itself in need of quantifiable performance 
metrics after having recently retooled its support for the war fighter (OPNAV  
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2006).  The original structure was aligned along geographic boundaries, which 
often led to poor use of manpower and assets, whereas the new structure is 
aligned with warfare communities. 
Most of the production of forecasts originally came from large, regional 
centers that produced all environmental support for units that did not have a 
ship’s company METOC support cell onboard.  In this case, one group of 
forecasters became regional experts, but their energy was spread through many 
different disciplines of combat.  One METOC community member could have 
been tasked to create a flight plan forecast, ocean sound speed propagation 
profile, and a special operations wave and surf forecast during one watch cycle.  
This meant that forecasters needed to be proficient at many types of atmospheric 
and oceanic forecasting for their region.  When a unit that was being supported 
by one regional center transitioned to another region, the unit would be handed 
off to a new center, often with a dramatic change on how support was provided.  
Additionally, the organic METOC division (OA division) on an aircraft carrier (CV) 
or an amphibious assault ship (LHA/LHD) reported to the CO of the ship and not 
to the METOC community.  This led to non-standard support between OA 
divisions due to a lack of unifying command. 
To resolve the shortcomings of having the METOC community aligned 
geographically, the community has been realigned by warfare types, sometimes 
called business lines.  Nine warfare directorates have been established to better 
serve the customer.  The nine warfare directorates are: Anti-Submarine Warfare; 
Mine Warfare; Naval Special Warfare; Fleet Support; Maritime Weather; Aviation 
Safety; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); Navigation; and 
Precise Time and Astronomy.  By aligning with a single warfare type, METOC 
personnel in each directorate can tailor their skill sets for the customers they are 
supporting.  This reduces the time needed to learn many different disciplines 
while working at one assignment and frees up more man-hours for production of 




same time that a force reduction was implemented, but it is believed that 
alignment by warfare type approach will ultimately give better support (OPNAV 
2006).   
The Maritime Weather directorate has taken over the role of most of the 
previous ship’s-company OA divisions, and the OA divisions’ personnel are now 
assigned to two centralized commands, one in San Diego and one in Norfolk, 
called Strike Group Oceanography Teams (SGOTs).  The members of the 
divisions will report to a Commanding Officer (CO) in the METOC community and 
will be attached to the CVs and LHA/LHDs in a temporary duty status during a 
major deployment and associated training cycle.  This allows for centralized 
meteorology and METOC support training, a fluid manpower pool, and eliminates 
the inefficient use of forecasters being assigned full-time to ships in dry-dock and 
in maintenance availabilities.  The result of the SGOT, again, is fewer people 
giving better support. 
The METOC community realignment raises two questions: (1) Can the 
realigned METOC community provide quality weather support to the war fighter?  
(2) If the METOC community was poorly aligned before and no one suffered, 
does that imply that the community does not provide a tangible benefit?  The 
answer to both of those questions can be found through the same source: the 
metrics methods developed by Hinz (2004) that were originally intended as a 
response to the Federal Government’s use of PART.  By analyzing the 
forecasting process using metrics and linking it to something tangible, such as 
impacted missions, the value of the METOC community to the war fighter can be 
measured. 
2. The Importance of Metrics Today 
 The use of metrics to analyze forecast value has importance beyond 
justifying budgets.  Some of the important functions of METOC support to DoD 
operations are to enable and enhance combat effectiveness, to protect the life 
and property of US personnel and assets, and to ensure the safety and 
effectiveness of peacetime operations such as training and humanitarian 
assistance.  All of these functions, or purposes, imply that excellence in METOC 
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support will help protect lives and other resources.  Metrics are needed to help 
determine how well METOC community fulfills those functions, and how the 
community can fulfill those functions better. 
The way we fight wars has changed, and the way in which the METOC 
community supports wars has also changed.  Sometime between the Korean 
War and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), wars have gone from being 
defined by large armies and theater-wide fronts to being associated with guerilla 
tactics, urban warfare, and small scale operations.  The use of weapons has 
changed from carpet bombing to a combination of precision weapons and the 
extensive use of intelligence.  Along with this shift in the war fighting paradigm, 
there has been a need to change the way METOC support of warfare is 
provided.  Forecasts have gone from broad regional horizontal weather 
depictions and prognostic blends to specialized products, such as lunar 
illumination predictions and ISR cloud coverage forecasts that support very 
specialized missions.   
 Modern forecasts must provide improved depictions of mesoscale and 
microscale phenomenon.  Broad overviews of the weather neglect small, but 
critical, effects that can cripple modern warfare operations.  Average winds over 
a region do not accurately represent localized effects that can include higher 
winds and dust lifted from the surface that would wreak havoc on laser guided 
munitions.  Using open ocean sea swell height for a coastal region could ruin a 
SEAL insertion onto the beach if breaking wave height was unanticipated.  
Specialized tactics and weapons are often more sensitive to environmental 
impacts than conventional weapons and forces.  Due to the large scale and large 
variability associated with traditional operation area forecasts, tailored products 
are needed for small, sensitive operations.   Given the narrow band of operability 
for many sensitive operations, to have poor specialized support can be as bad as 
or worse than having no support.   
This leads to back to the other benefits of metrics beyond those 
associated with budgeting.  Since it is no longer useful to categorize an entire 
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theater of operations with one blanket forecast, more man power is needed to 
provide specialized, tailored forecasts.  METOC personnel now have to spend 
more man hours understanding the needs of many specialized customers, 
whereas before they could provide a more generic support product.  This extra 
support costs extra resources: not only must the cost versus value be justified, 
but the resources must be spent as efficiently as possible.  The ability to 
measure and improve specific mission support, such as strike operations or 
humanitarian assistance requiring beach operations, will save lives and could 
serve to validate increased expenditures associated with tailored support, if it can 
be shown that the more expensive tailored support is needed.  
B. BACKGROUND 
In this section we will review several studies that were conducted as part 
of the NPS METOC Metrics Project, and that have examined ways of statistically 
linking forecasts, weather impacts, and costs.  The logical progression of these 
studies begins with work on the costs of METOC related mishaps (MRMs).  Later 
studies brought together lessons learned from the PART concept and the MRM 
work to find statistical links between forecasts and operational success by the 
war fighter.  The most recent studies have explored the concept of collecting 
operational metrics in real-time and exploiting them as a scorecard for 
operational weather support. 
1. METOC Related Mishaps 
The first two studies of the NPS METOC Metrics Project laid the 
groundwork for understanding the linking weather forecasts to operational 
impacts.  Specifically, LCDR Ruben Cantu identified the role of weather in Class 
A weather mishaps (Cantu 2001), and LCDR Brett Martin sought to identify the 
importance of METOC conditions in conducting operational risk management 
(ORM) (Martin 2002).  The goal of both of these studies was to identify how 
weather, and what kind of weather, contributes to mishaps, and how much 
MRMs cost the military.  The studies did not intend to collect metrics data, but 
instead they used data collected by other sources.  Cantu (2001) sought to 
identify which Class A mishaps (mishaps that result in a loss of over $1,000,000, 
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loss of aircraft, or death/permanent total disability) from 1990 to 1998 were 
MRMs.  Martin (2002), on the other hand, studied Navy ORM practices and their 
ability to reduce costly mishaps through managing risk using all available 
information.   Martin reviewed all Class A, B, and C afloat mishaps from March of 
1997 to March of 2002 and found that METOC factors contributed to a number of 
afloat mishaps.  The result of both studies was that a significant number of 
mishaps are related to METOC factors.  The main recommendation from both 
studies was also very similar: improve forecasts and provide the customer with a 
better understanding of the operational significance of the forecast to reduce 
mishaps.   
2. Operation Based Metrics 
Later studies focused on other types of forecasts besides operational 
impacts.  By doing statistical analyses of operations during OIF and applying 
lessons learned about the value of accurate and believed forecasts, LCDR Jake 
Hinz and Capt. Jeff Jarry were able to develop metrics describing the impacts of 
weather and weather forecasts to combat missions.   
Hinz (2004) applied NWS metrics to the Navy forecasting problem.  His 
goal, as mentioned earlier, was to apply lessons learned during the NWS’s 
implementation of the PART initiative to quantify the value of METOC support to 
operational units.  He applied a variation of the NWS metrics concept to create a 
series of performance metrics he called the NPS Metric Method.  His 
performance metrics focused on evaluating forecaster performance independent 
of mission impacts.  The core element of the NPS Metric Method was the 
adaptation of two key calculations from the NWS for use in Navy METOC 
applications.  The first calculation was forecast accuracy (FAC), which is a 
comparison of the number of correct forecasts for a certain event compared to 
the total number of forecasts for that event (Hinz 2004).  This provides an 
objective measurement of the forecasters’ ability to predict a category of events.  
The FAC measurement has a down side in that a forecaster could miss a rare 
event consistently and still have a high FAC score.  In this case, the high FAC 
score conveys no information about the forecaster’s ability to predict the rare 
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event (Hinz 2004).  For this reason, Hinz (2004) also applied a probability of 
detection (POD) calculation to provide a check and balance.  POD represents the 
forecasters’ ability to predict an event before it happened.  The POD calculation, 
when combined with a FAC calculation, would prevent forecasters’ scores from 
over-representing their ability if they were to hedge a forecast by not forecasting 
a particular event or had trouble predicting a particular event.  Hinz then applied 
his metrics method to historical data collected at the Combined Air Operations 
Center (CAOC) and other forecasting entities involved in the early stages of OIF 
(Figure 5-6).  The main data set that Hinz used was incomplete and inconsistent 
for the purposes of his study.  This is in part because the data collection was not 
designed to support specific metrics analyses. 
Jarry (2005) focused his efforts on an analysis of data collected from the 
Air Mobility Command (AMC) and its Combat Weather Teams (CWT) during 
fiscal year 2004.  His goal was to advance the application of metrics to include 
operational impacts metrics.  Operational impacts metrics describe how forecasts 
affect the planning and execution of operations. Jarry developed the missions 
saved metric that measures the number of missions that were successful 
because the mission was changed in response to a forecast of adverse or 
negative weather conditions (Figure 7).  This gave Jarry the ability to show when 
Air Force Weather (AFW) was able to provide good decision making inputs to the 
war planners.  By applying missions saved and variations of missions saved, 
Jarry was also able to achieve a measure of the value of weather forecasts to the 
war fighter.  However, Jarry ran into problems similar to those encountered by 
Hinz.  Jarry also used a historical dataset, and his data was collected by the 
CWTs per the direction of AFW.  His dataset was more complete, but he 
encountered problems with inconsistent collection procedures and different 
interpretation of the collection by different organizations.  Again, these problems 
were due mainly to the data collection not being designed to support the metrics 
analyses that Jarry conducted. 
Both of these studies developed and applied metrics to show the 
correlation between good forecasts and mission successes, bad forecasts and 
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mission failures, and how operational impacts vary from one forecast to another 
depending on the forecast accuracy and the mission supported by the forecast.  
The recommendations from both studies were very similar: adopt a service-wide 
metrics program to measure the value of weather support to operational units.  
Both studies reached similar conclusion on procedures for putting together a 
metrics program.  Both studies suffered from difficulties with their historical 
datasets, and both were unable to give their metrics results until several months 
after the missions were completed.  Their difficulties with datasets and long 
delays in issuing results highlighted the need for a standardized collection 
program and the ability to compute results in near real-time.  
3. Real-Time Metrics 
The most recent stage of NPS metrics work has sought to apply the 
concepts developed by Hinz (2004) and Jarry (2005) to the real time collection 
and analysis of data on current operations.  By collecting and analyzing mission 
data in near real-time, forecasters are able to grade their forecasts, and war 
fighters can better understand the value of the weather forecast as it applies to 
mission planning and execution.  LCDR Mark Butler was the first to develop such 
a metrics system with his system to collect and analyze data collected at a 
training command.  Butler (2005) made the first logical step to collect data on 
forecasts issued by the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanography 
Detachment, Fallon, NV (NPMOD) for training missions flown at the Naval Strike 
and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC).  His goal was to develop a system, based on 
the Hinz (2004) and Jarry (2005) concepts, which would collect forecast and 
mission data from NPMOD and NSAWC and provide results of the metrics 
calculations in near real-time.  Near real-time metrics enable analyses that can 
be used at the end of the day, instead of months later, to help quantify value and 
improve METOC support.  Maj. Karen Darnell (2006) implemented a version of 
the Butler (2005) system to analyze forecasts and impacts to operations at CWTs 
supporting Air Force fighter aircraft missions.  Both studies used concepts from 
both Hinz (2004) and Jarry (2005) to develop a set of performance metrics and 
operation impact calculations to meet the needs of their customers.  The Butler 
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study was able to successfully provide real-time metrics analyses to the 
forecasters and the customers by having the forecasters collect forecast and 
impacts data for the calculation.  NPMOD found the data extremely useful, and 
uses it to help NSAWC planners prepare future training missions.  The Darnell 
(2006) study was a first attempt to provide real time metrics support for real world 
operations.  A working system was successfully put in place for Air Force 
Weather (AFW).  There were some problems with the data collection methods, 
but those problems provided some valuable lessons.  The data collection 
process from the Darnell study relied on a long, four page questionnaire given to 
the pilots to assess the forecasts and the impacts (see Figure 5 of Darnell 
(2006)).  The questionnaire proved to be too ambitious for the current life stage 
of implementing metrics into operational use.  The recommendations for the 
projects were also different.  Butler (2005) concluded that continued use of the 
collection system at NPMOD and NSAWC would continue to familiarize the 
forecasters that go through the training with the pilots, and prepare them to 
collect metrics in the fleet.  Additionally, he recommended that the system be 
implemented outside of training commands.  The Darnell (2006) study 
recognized the shortcomings of the information collected in that study and 
recommended that the data collection process be revised to better support the 
CWTs. 
C. METOC METRICS NEEDS 
We have reviewed the need for a Navy METOC community metrics 
program from several perspectives: (1) the federal government requirement 
outlined in PART that supports tracking the value of the Navy METOC 
community to its customers; (2) the need to quantify the benefits that more 
expensive tailored METOC support can bring to modern warfare; and (3) the 
need to use to improve the process of producing accurate forecasts and the 
process of using forecasts in the mission planning process.  A standard set of 
Navy METOC community metrics will help rate the forecasting skill of the 
community and of the individual units, it will track the value of the community to 
the war fighter, and it will assist the customer in their mission planning and 
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mission evaluation.  For example, the customer can weigh the value of a forecast 
in their planning by knowing the accuracy of different types of forecasts.  If the 
customer knows that the forecaster accuracy (FAC) for high winds over the target 
area tends to be near 100%, and high winds are forecasted during the mission 
time, the customer can weigh the forecast appropriately in planning.  Conversely, 
customers can choose not to act on a forecast for a less predictable event if 
circumstances warrant.  Ideally, any customer could find out the skill with which 
any individual phenomenon tends to forecasted and be able to immediately 
identify the value that the forecast information adds to the planning process.  
Implementing a metrics system is not without its hurdles.  A lack of manpower, 
leadership, and interest has likely stymied many previous efforts.  Current efforts 
to implement a metrics program also have obstacles, such as garnering 
participation, lack of understanding of the usefulness of metrics, and limited 
access to critical information needed to complete metrics analyses. 
1. Standardization 
It is important to standardize the METOC metrics process throughout the 
entire METOC community.  The metrics programs we have developed in this 
study relate to forecasting for air-strike missions, but this concept can be applied 
throughout the forecasting spectrum.  If senior leadership becomes familiar with 
a standard type of valuing system for Navy METOC forecasts, then decision 
makers can make better use of forecasts across different warfare types.  This 
would be invaluable in large scale operations requiring multiple types of 
forecasts, such as emergency non-combatant evacuation operations, where air-
strike is working in conjunction with Marines on the ground, landing craft in the 
surf-zone, small boat operations, and naval gun fire support. 
2. Navy Benefit 
Once a standardized system of measuring METOC forecasting 
performance and operational impacts is implemented in the Navy, the results can 
be used to monitor how the METOC community is doing and to identify how it 
can improve.  First, the data from the metrics program can be used within the 
Navy METOC community to track and identify shortcomings in forecasting skill.  
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Second, metrics can also help quantify the value of the METOC community to 
the war fighter by directly linking mission performance to mission impacts that 
were predicted by the forecaster.  The linking of mission performance and 
forecasted mission impacts allows the METOC community to identify ways in 
which the METOIC community can better support war fighters.  Finally, decision 
makers can use metric data to better weight forecasts in their decision making 
processes based on the past performance statistics of similar forecasts. 
The first identified benefit, tracking the forecasting skill of individual units, 
or of particular forecast parameters and situations, could be a great educational 
tool if used correctly.  It would help the Navy METOC community identify training 
areas and forecast challenges that need improvement.  Measuring how well 
different regions of the world are supported would give insights into the Navy 
METOC community’s understanding of that region.  Once a representative data 
set for forecasting skill is available from a Navy METOC metrics program, 
CNMOC could implement improved and focused training to resolve any 
forecasting shortfalls that have been identified through the metrics program.  The 
temptation must be resisted to rate individuals against their peers.  Not only do 
the chances for corrupted metrics data exists when the data is being collected 
from those who are being graded, but it must be remembered that it is the entire 
METOC support system that is producing the forecast, not just the mental 
processes and work habits of the individual forecasters.  The presence or lack of 
observations, the capabilities or limitations of the numerical model, and even the 
timeliness or latency of communications has effects on the forecast grade that 
may outweigh the effects of having the best forecaster working the weather 
impacts problem. 
The second benefit, the ability to track the value of the Navy METOC 
community through the eyes of the war fighter using a metrics program, is easier 
to grasp than any other benefit.  By incorporating the missions saved metric from 
Jarry (2005) and the idea of potential saves from Butler (2005) and Darnell 
(2006) into a METOC community metrics program, a number of values that are 
understandable to non-meteorologists can be created.  Missions saved can give 
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pilots and mission planning cells an idea of the mitigation value provided by the 
METOC unit.  The missions saved numbers can also be somewhat translated 
into dollar amounts that can have an impact on budget decisions (Jarry 2005).  
By counting both missions that have been changed due to a forecaster 
recommendation and forecasts that were not changed and unsuccessful, a rough 
dollar “value” can be assigned to the METOC community’s forecasting.  The 
value of a mission saved would account for fuel costs, maintenance costs from 
added hours on equipment, lost man hours from work supporting the mission, 
and lost weapons from a mission attempt (Jarry 2005).  This calculation of the 
value of a mission saved would be imperfect, given the large number of 
unknowns regarding mission costs, but the rough monetary value of the Navy 
METOC community could be at least estimated. 
Improved mission support and forecasts are clear benefits to customers 
that could be achieved through a METOC metrics program.  The less obvious 
benefit to the customer is in improved understanding of how to weight a forecast 
against other planning inputs.  Mission planners, and other high level decision 
makers, operate by weighing all of the inputs that come to them through various 
channels.  Each input the decision maker receives is information that affects the 
uncertainty of the decision to be made.  But it can be very difficult to quantify the 
amount of uncertainty associated with each input.  Decision makers need to 
know how much uncertainty exists in all the inputs, including the forecasts, in 
order to optimize their decisions.  Forecasts should not be considered completely 
accurate; rather they should be considered as providing probability information.  
However, often times they are considered by decision makers as either absolute 
truth of future environmental conditions or they are considered worthless and 
ignored completely.  A well executed metrics program could help both 
forecasters and decision makers understand the probabilistic nature of the 
forecasts, and shed light on which forecasts are of greater value and which ones 
are of lesser value.  Using metrics such as POD or FAR (Hinz 2004, Jarry 2005), 
the chance of a certain phenomenon being detected can be estimated and a 
confidence value can be assigned to the forecast inputs.  The mission planner  
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will then have a better understanding of the uncertainty involved in the decisions 
to be made and therefore be better equipped to make the decisions 
(Environmental 2003). 
3. Past Challenges 
There were attempts prior to 2001 to create a METOC metrics program, 
but those efforts were poorly documented and had almost no lasting effects.   
Large scale efforts to create a METOC metrics system beyond those outlined 
earlier in this study do not seem to have taken place, and it is the large scale 
efforts that are needed to reach across the CNMOC claimancy as a whole.  
Individual commands have been required to maintain forecast verification 
programs, but it was to be of their own design and administration.  These 
programs disappeared for the most part when the command inspection 
requirement was cancelled.   
The large scale efforts needed to create a metrics system have likely not 
existed because of a series of suppressing factors.  The first factor was a lack of 
man power.  Somebody would actually have to do the work to create and 
develop the system.  In that case the Navy would either have to use sailors that 
are already tasked to their limit, or would have to have procured funding for an 
outside agency to complete the metrics program development.  The second likely 
hurdle was lack of expertise on how to develop and implement a metrics 
program.  Most people in the METOC community have little or no education or 
training on metrics in general or METOC metrics in particular.  The third likely 
hurdle to a large scale metrics system was a lack of centralized control.  The lack 
of a higher entity directing a specific metrics effort resulted in ambiguous 
verbiage calling for subordinate commands to “improve output metrics to better 
define our requirements and resource needs” (Clark 2004).  Without clear, 
unifying direction there was no chance that a standard METOC community wide 
metrics system would be developed.  The fourth likely hurdle was a lack of 
broad-based interest for a METOC metrics program.  We have identified a 
pattern in the METOC community that unless a customer specifically complains 
about service, the community assumes all is well.  Unless a customer actually 
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asked for performance metrics, the chances of metrics being created would have 
been very slim.  The four hurdles outlined here have been partially overcome in a 
series of NPS studies funded by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and Space 
and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).  Funding in the form of 
grants, and manpower in the form of research students and contract employees, 
has been provided to do the work.  Control of the project is being handled by a 
forum of Navy METOC leadership and NPS professors.  Interest in METOC 
metrics has developed both in the Federal Government in the form of the PART 
initiative and by customers of Navy METOC (Woll 2006). 
4. Current Challenges 
With many of the past organizational barriers resolved, the challenges we 
expected to face in our project were mainly of an operational nature.  We 
anticipated an initial struggle to garner participation, both by METOC units and 
customers.  Without fully realizing the benefit that forecasters and customers 
stand to reap, participation in a metrics program would be viewed as a wasteful 
addition of work.  Forcing participation could have resulted in bad data that would 
be hard to filter from good data, so the best solution was education about the 
aforementioned values of a METOC metrics program.  We also anticipated 
problems regarding communications connectivity.  Butler (2005) recognized the 
need for a metrics system to be centralized to allow for standardization, 
maintenance and upgrading.  But this centralization requires that participating 
units have continuously reliable internet access to reach back to the metrics 
processing computer.  When NPMOD Fallon was using the system, internet 
access was not a problem, but as we branched out to other units in the fleet, we 
found that unclassified internet access was not as reliable.  Finally, we 
anticipated problems with training on use of the metrics system.  We would need 
to ensure that only quality data was collected, but without extensive travel and 
time, it would not be possible for the main participants of this study to train all 
potential users.  We concentrated on these three hurdles in this study while 
working towards our goals. 
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D. GOALS OF THE STUDY 
There were three goals that this study intended to meet.  The first goal 
was to adapt the metrics collection and analysis system developed by Butler 
(2005) to operational use for strike warfare support and for eventual use across a 
broad range of warfare types.  A second goal was to implement this system on 
an operational CV.  The final goal was to conduct an initial evaluation of the 
accuracy of METOC products provided in support of strike warfare and the 
operational impacts of those products on strike warfare. 
The Butler (2005) study showed the feasibility of collecting forecast and 
impacts information and providing near real-time metrics calculations.  His 
system was focused on collecting and analyzing data from an air wing training 
facility that operates at a limited capacity and on a more predictable schedule 
than do carrier based air wings, especially those in combat zones.  But we 
determined that with some adaptation, the Butler study could be used for war 
fighter units conducting in real world (non-training) operations.  The types of 
forecasts, missions, impacts, and mitigation procedures used in these real world 
operations are different than those used during training missions, but there are 
many similarities.  The greatest challenge we anticipated was providing 
accessibility to operational units.  The Butler (2005) study collected data from a 
training command with a fixed unclassified internet connection.  In that study, the 
information being collected was unclassified by its nature, and there were no 
concerns that the central metrics system would not be accessible.  In our study, 
however, the information was classified due to its operational association, and 
the internet was not always accessible while the ships were at sea.  For these 
reasons, we had to adapt our system for use on the Secure Information Protocol 
Routing Network (SIPRNet) which is a government internet system that can pass 
classified information between users.   The SIPRNet is certified to handle 
information up to a secret classification, and the network is generally available at 
all times while ships are at sea due to the high volume of operations critical traffic 
that is passed through it.  There are always times that a network is down at sea,  
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and for that reason a sub-goal was to produce a set of paper forms that collect 
the same information as our web form to be used in the event that the SIPRNet 
was not available. 
The second adaptation we made to the Butler (2005) system adaptation 
was to ensure that it can be easily applied to a broad range of warfare types.  
Our initial application of the system was to be strike warfare.  To facilitate 
standardization throughout the service, we wanted to design our system to look 
very similar when applied to amphibious warfare, undersea warfare, and other 
warfare types.  As mentioned earlier, this standardization will lead to more 
efficient use of METOC metrics.   
After these adaptations of the Butler (2005) system were achieved, our 
second goal in this study was to implement our system on an operational CV.  
The operational use by a deployed unit would give us feedback on our system 
and allow us to make corrections and fine tune it.   
Our final goal was to conduct initial evaluations of the performance of 
METOC products provided in support of strike warfare and the operational 
impacts of those products on strike warfare.  Implementing the collection system 
on a CV would also allow us to do initial calculations of forecast performance and 
operational impacts to determine the operational benefit of METOC support to 
strike operations.  These calculations would allow us to conduct an early check 
on whether we were making the right calculations and looking at the right data.  
We hoped to provide through our study a tool set that can be used to: (1) 
measure the effectiveness of the Navy METOC system; (2) demonstrate the 
contributions Navy METOC provides to the war fighter; and (3) recommend ways 
that Navy METOC can be improved. .  
The following chapters outline how we worked towards these goals.  We 
start by outlining our data and methods of working with the data in Chapter II.  
We then look at the results of implementing our system and the results of the 
data calculations in Chapter III.  Finally, we summarize our study and provide 
recommendations in Chapter IV. 
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II. DATA AND METHODS 
A. DATA 
Based on the recommendations for future work by Butler (2005) and his 
metrics work implementing an automated data collection and analysis system for 
NSAWC, the next goal in the overall NPS METOC metrics project was 
implementation of a metrics program on a U.S. Navy afloat unit.  Our first step 
towards the goal of an afloat metrics program started with CDR Steve Woll, the 
CO of SGOT East in Norfolk, Virginia.  CDR Woll held a similar vision of 
implementing a comprehensive metrics system onboard afloat units.  
The ideal METOC metrics system for strike warfare is one that collects 
data on early mission planning forecasts given to Air Tasking Order (ATO) 
planners, collects mitigation recommendations given to planners based on poor 
environmental conditions, and tracks the mitigations taken by the planners before 
promulgating the final ATO, and any revisions before or during the ATO 
execution window.  The ATO is a schedule of all flights and air combat missions 
in a specific theater or under a specific commander.  The metrics system would 
track the forecasts given to the pilots conducting the missions, their observations 
during the mission, and mitigations taken by the pilots if there were adverse 
METOC conditions.  The comprehensive nature of this ideal metrics system 
would eventually paint a very complete picture of how the Navy METOC 
community provides value to the whole of strike warfare (Woll 2006).  We and 
CDR Woll hoped to quantify the value of Navy METOC to both planners and 
budget makers, information about observed METOC impacts to strike missions, 
the ability to forecast these impacts, and the mitigation of these impacts.   
We started our study with the intention of tracking the planning forecasts 
given to the ATO planners, but we learned that the OA division’s role is currently 
to provide only mission briefs to the pilots conducting the missions on the ATO.  
The OA division does provide larger scale and longer lead-time weather briefs to 
other planning and intelligence personnel on the ship, but not to strike planners, 
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and these longer lead-time briefings tend not to be mission specific.  With an 
established pilot briefing and de-briefing system already in place, we re-focused 
our efforts on tracking the forecasts given to pilots and mitigations taken by 
pilots.  Thus, the focus of our metrics development efforts was on the 
performance and operational impacts of the mission execution weather forecasts 
(lead times of 12 hours or less).   
Future METOC metrics studies should focus on the performance and 
operational impacts of the forecasts provided to the CAOC (for more on this, see 
chapter IV).  One of CDR Woll’s goals is to increase the involvement of Navy 
METOC forecasters by incorporating them into the planning phase of missions.  
Involvement at the planning phase of a mission requires increased information 
flow among the OA division, the CAOC, and the CV Intelligence Center (CVIC) 
on the CV during the ATO planning phase.  Changing the way ATO planning is 
done to accommodate increasing OA division involvement would require a large 
amount of diplomacy, planning, and time (Woll 2006, Schmeiser 2006).   
The work CDR Woll has done with earlier stages of the current NPS 
METOC metrics project and his position within the METOC community allowed 
him to identify appropriate participants for our study.  Based on ship schedules 
and the willingness of the ships’ OA divisions to participate in our study, we 
decided to focus our initial development efforts on the aircraft carrier USS 
Enterprise, followed by a later data collection efforts on the USS Enterprise, USS 
Eisenhower, and USS Stennis. 
We began by identifying the role of the OA division on a carrier and what 
products they provide to their customers.  Once we knew the METOC support 
being given to the customers and how it was being used, we developed a data 
collection strategy that identified the data to be collected and any pitfalls that 
might be encountered during the collection process.   
1. OA Division Role 
Before we could collect data on how METOC forecasts affected strike 
operations, we needed to know what was provided by the OA division to the 
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customers.  We had to identify who the customer was, what products were 
produced, when they were provided to the customer, and how the customer used 
them.  
Our original intended customer was a mission planning cell at the aircraft 
carrier level.  We originally believed that the air wing command that had 
cognizance over all the aircraft embarked onboard the CV had a mitigation 
capability that could change missions in reaction to forecasted environmental 
conditions.  By comparing the forecasted weather and mitigation 
recommendations given to the onboard air wing planning personnel against 
mitigated and non-mitigated missions, we could have a clear understanding of 
the value of the weather forecast and mitigation recommendations to the planner.  
That planning forecast and mitigation process is used at NSAWC and was 
analyzed by Butler (2005) who found it to be very useful in providing support to 
NSWAC planners.  The Hinz (2004), Jarry (2005), and Darnell (2006) studies 
also analyzed similar types of planning forecast and mitigation recommendation 
customer support.   
However, during the planning phase of our study we learned that the ATO 
is produced at the theater CAOC and then sent to the participating air wings 
operating in the theater, so that the embarked air wings are not heavily involved 
in the ATO planning.  In most cases, the weather cell at the CAOC provides 
weather for the purposes of planning and writing the ATO (Schmeiser 2006) 
along with weather used for mitigating weather impacts on missions on the ATO.  
Once the ATO is received on the ship, only minor changes can be requested by 
the air wing.  These changes are generally limited to changing the weapons 
carried by the aircraft, canceling missions, and in some cases altering the timing 
of the mission (Ford 2006, Schmeiser 2006).   
Since the OA division was not forecasting for the planning of missions or 
for the mitigation of missions, we brought up the question as to what the OA 
division was forecasting for.  Conversations with LCDR Gregory Schmeiser, the 
Executive Officer of SGOT Norfolk, revealed that “we give value added [mission 
22 
information] to the pilots…  Our value added is the situational awareness about 
the environment...  We give safety of flight forecasts, tactical sensor predictions, 
etc.” (Schmeiser 2006).  According to SGOT Norfolk, the OA division’s customer 
on the aircraft carrier is the pilot and the OA division provides a forecast of the 
weather that the pilot will be operating in. 
With pilots currently as the main customer of the OA division, we were 
unable to develop metrics on the usefulness of planning forecast.  Since there 
was a limited mitigation capability on the ship, there would be little opportunity to 
calculate some of the valuable metrics developed in prior studies such as 
missions saved (Jarry 2005, Butler 2005, Darnell 2006).  Working with the pilots 
as the main customer required us to focus on how mission execution forecasts 
improve the ability of pilots to complete their mission, knowing that the forecasts 
come too late to have much impact on mission planning.  As mentioned above, 
LCDR Schmeiser outlined that the pilot uses mission execution forecasts mainly 
for situational awareness (SA).  This is consistent with the Air Force Weather 
Strategic Plan and Vision (AFWSPV) that states, “if you ‘boiled down’ the AFW 
business to its essence, you would find that we integrate into operations and 
intelligence, that our analyses provide battlefield situational awareness, and our 
predictions and tailored products enhance decision superiority for commanders 
at every level” (AFWSPV 2004).  However, it is difficult to quantify the impacts of 
SA on mission execution.  We presume that these impacts tend to be beneficial, 
but they tend to be somewhat intangible.  The concept of intangible benefit from 
mission weather forecasts briefed by a forecaster was also outlined by Darnell 
(2006).  In interviewing Air Force pilots, she learned that the pilots’ SA benefited 
greatly by having weather personnel available in-person to explain expected 
atmospheric conditions (Darnell 2006).  SA is a hard entity to quantify, and we 
have made no attempt to do so.  We can, however, intuitively understand the 
value of good SA to the pilot, and note that awareness of how weather might 
affect the route or area is acknowledged as an industry standard.  Implicit in the 
regulations concerning receiving and filing of weather reports (FAA, 2006) is the  
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assumption that situational awareness of weather by pilots is absolutely 
necessary.  Although we cannot measure SA, we can measure whether 
forecasts provide accurate SA to pilots. 
The pilots and strike leads are provided a flight plan weather brief by the 
OA division, generally 1.5 to 2.5 hours before the planned time of the mission.  
The weather brief, as shown in Figures 9 and 10, consists of information about 
several parameters, including flight level winds, icing, turbulence, ceilings, 
visibility, and atmospheric conditions that would affect sensors.  The pilot uses 
the forecast to mentally prepare for a mission and to visualize what to expect 
during the mission.  A good forecast reduces the range of conditions for which to 
prepare and allows the pilot to mentally rehearse options that can be used to 
alleviate a potential impact.  As an example of how SA is perceived as valuable, 
consider the case of forecasted turbulence.  If the pilot knew in advance that 
he/she was going to fly through an area of light to moderate turbulence, he/she 
probably would not change the intended mission track, nor would the forecaster 
recommend that the pilot change the track.  But the pilot would mentally prepare 
for the possibility of encountering turbulence and anticipate how he/she would 
mitigate it if it was actually encountered.  Thus, if moderate to severe turbulence 
was encountered, the pilot would be better prepared to take mitigating action, 
such as altering altitude, speed, or course.  Knowing about the turbulence didn’t 
cause the pilot to avoid the impacting phenomenon, but it allowed a quick, 
preplanned action.  Most importantly, the impact was not a surprise that resulted 
in several minutes of distracted thinking in a combat zone. 
In a situation such as described above, there is an opportunity to collect 
mitigation data, although in this case the mitigating action occurs during mission 
execution rather than during mission planning (the type of mitigation examined by 
Jarry 2005, Butler 2005, and Darnell 2006).  In our study, we were able to collect 
data on the major actions taken by pilots during mission execution to reduce the 
negative weather impacts on their missions.  This data included information on 
what was predicted, what was encountered, and what mitigating actions had to 
be taken.  The benefit of metrics based on this type of data is that they show 
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when pilots were expecting negative impacts, mentally prepared for the impacts, 
and took mitigating action during the mission.  Note that there is no implication in 
our data or analyses that the pilot should have changed the mission before hand.   
So, despite the limited role of the OA division during the planning phase, 
we were able to devise data collection and calculations that measure benefit to 
strike operations.  With the pilots identified as the primary customers of the OA 
division, we were able to measure the accuracy of the flight path weather 
forecasts and to infer their value to the pilots’ SA in the combat zone.  SA is 
difficult to quantify and collect data on, but we were able to measure inputs to SA 
and to quantify responses to weather impacts where accurate SA is believed to 
be useful.  
2. Data Collection 
After understanding the support provided by the OA division and how that 
support is used by the OA division’s customers (the air wing pilots), we 
determined the data that we would need to collect to assess the performance 
and the operational impacts of that support.  The data had to include information 
about: (1) the forecasted and observed weather phenomena that could lead to 
negative impacts; and (2) the mitigating actions taken by the pilots.  The data 
needed to be collected in as consistent, objective, and accurate a manner as 
possible.  Finally, the data needed to be put into a format that allowed basic 
metrics calculations to be performed. 
The data needed for this project had to: (1) be relevant to missions flown 
by strike aircraft; (2) known in advance and consistent for all missions; (3) include 
information about the forecasted and observed weather conditions; and (4)  
include information about what the pilots planned to do and what they actually 
did.  Additionally, we did not want to include any weather parameters beyond 
those already being forecasted by the OA divisions.  In discussions with 
members of SGOT Norfolk, we decided to collect forecast and observational data 
on the following nine METOC parameters: 
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1. Surface winds 
2. Winds aloft (up to 30,000 feet) 
3. Turbulence 
4. Icing 
5. Cloud cells that are associated with thunderstorms 
6. Cloud layers 
7. Visibility 
8. Precipitation 
9. Thermal contrast 
Data on the forecasts of these parameters were collected for five different 
mission phases: (1) aircraft launch; (2) enroute to and from mission area; (3) 
enroute refueling; (4) target area; and (5) aircraft recovery.  As standard 
procedure, the OA division also recorded the observed values for the nine 
parameters during launch and recovery, except for icing and turbulence.  The OA 
division was not already collecting observations from the three other mission 
phases.  For observations of the conditions during these three phases, we relied 
on pilot observations, in particular, pilot observations of negative conditions 
associated with the nine parameters during phases 2-4. 
 Obtaining data proved to be one of our larger challenges.  An ideal data 
set would give an analyst enough information to fully understand an 
environmental situation without having been in that environment.  The problem 
with obtaining the ideal data set is that generally in real world operational 
settings, accurate observations of enroute and target conditions are hard to 
obtain.  The pilots of course observe the conditions as they fly through them.  
Although they are not meteorological observers by trade, we decided to use their 




informal analyses of by Darnell (2006) that indicated that pilots are relatively  
good observers of weather conditions, especially conditions that have a negative 
impact on their missions. 
A major challenge to creating a data set for the purposes of our study was 
finding a balance of enough data to accurately describe what happened in the 
environment without overtaxing the pilots.  Darnell (2006) observed that her “data 
collection form was too long and therefore aircrews were reluctant to complete it.  
The form was also not structured in a flow consistent with aircrew thought 
processes after they had just completed a mission.”  The Darnell (2006) pilot 
mission debriefing forms, seen in Figure 8, asked many useful questions and 
provided data that could be used in a variety of analyses.  The form lengthiness, 
however, was a liability.  Hinz (2006) reported that the collection of pilot data by 
OA division personnel on the USS Nimitz was made much more effective and 
efficient by having an experienced AG attend the intelligence debriefings of the 
pilots.  At these debriefings, the METOC data collector would mainly collect the 
needed METOC and operational impacts data by listening to the intelligence 
debrief and quickly making hand written notes that were later entered into an 
electronic database. 
Based on these prior efforts, we decided to carefully limit the amount of 
data we would try obtain directly from interviewing pilots.  Limiting the questions 
asked of the pilots would limit the chances that incorrect data would be given to 
the weather debriefer, and would increase the chances that pilots would be 
willing to cooperate in providing us with data.  To keep the post-mission interview 
short, we decided to ask the pilots three basic questions after each mission.  The 
first question asked was whether there were any inconsistencies between the 
forecasted weather phenomena and those that negatively impacted their 
missions.  The second question was what, if any, part of their mission was 
negatively impacted by weather.  The third question was whether they had to 
take any mitigating actions because of weather.  Pilots generally will remember if 
they experienced weather that negatively impacted their missions along with any 
unplanned actions that they had to take because of the weather (Schmeiser, 
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2006).  We learned that by asking pilots what they experienced that affected their 
mission they were more likely to participate than if we asked them to recount all 
the weather they experienced during the mission.  To simplify the job of the OA 
division, we developed a series of questions for use in collecting data during pilot 
debriefings.  It provided consistent wording and eliminated any variability that 
might have been caused if the pilots’ observations were recounted in an informal, 
unstructured interview.   
The final prerequisite was that the data be compatible with the analyses 
and metrics calculations that we wanted to conduct.  Many forecast performance 
metrics are based on the use of a contingency table similar to the one in Figure 
11.  The contingency table allows for easy categorization and grouping of 
forecasts.  The number of forecasts in each of the four categories (A-D) of the 
contingency table is used to calculate a wide range of forecast performance 
metrics (cf. Jarry 2005).  Values in the A-D diagonal are forecasts that verified as 
accurate.  Values in the B-C diagonal are forecasts that verified as inaccurate (cf. 
Jarry 2005).  More in depth metrics can also be calculated using comparisons of 
the different values in the table, and these calculations are described in the 
methodology section of this chapter. 
In order to be able to use contingency tables, the forecasts have to be 
recorded in the appropriate table category.  Generally this assignment is based 
on whether a specific condition (e.g., rain) was or was not forecasted and was or 
was not observed.  If the condition was forecasted and was observed, then the 
forecast is assigned to category A.  If the condition was not forecasted but was 
observed, then the forecast is assigned to category B.  If the condition was 
forecasted and was not observed, then the forecast is assigned to category C.  If 
the condition was not forecasted and was observed, then the forecast is 
assigned to category D.  To determine whether a condition was or was not 
forecasted, and was or was not observed, thresholds are used (e.g., minimum 
amount of precipitation, if rain is the condition).   
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For our study, we modified this general method due to the logistics of 
obtaining detailed meteorological observations from pilots in combat zones.  We 
considered using Go/No Go recommendations provided by forecasters as the 
basis for our thresholds (cf. Hinz 2004, Jarry 2005).  Go/No Go refers to 
forecaster recommendations that a mission be attempted or abandoned based 
on the predicted weather conditions.  We had to set that idea aside when we 
leaned that the OA division does not make Go/No Go recommendations 
(Schmeiser 2006).   
The OA division’s role is to provide forecasted weather conditions to the 
pilots.  The pilots then use the forecast to make their own execution decisions 
based on published METOC thresholds for the mission platform, sensors, and 
weapons.  With inputs from LCDR Schmeiser at SGOT Norfolk, we collected 
forecasts from the OA division according to whether they indicated severe 
weather impacts to the missions.  Severe impacts are those that prevent a 
mission from being completed without taking mitigating actions, and are generally 
categorized as a red condition on a red-yellow-green stoplight chart.  They can 
be such events as visibility ranges that prevent use of laser guided weapons, 
winds that prevent the launch and recovery of aircraft, or turbulence that exceeds 
the limitations of the airframe.  The severely impacted threshold represents the 
upper threshold of being able to complete a mission and is therefore a valuable 
measurement to the end users of metrics data.  Additionally, a pilot is likely to be 
able to accurately report severe impacts to a mission debriefer.  Thus, we chose 
to categorize the forecasts and the observations according to whether they 
indicated severe impacts or no severe impacts.  For our study, the condition we 
analyzed is the condition of severe impact and the corresponding contingency 
table for analyzing this condition is shown in Fig. 11.   This contingency table was 
applied to all nine METOC parameters (e.g., applied to analyze whether severe 
impacts from icing were or were not forecasted, and whether severe impacts 




3. Data Collection and Analysis IT Issues 
One of the primary findings of the Butler (2005) study was that a real time 
metrics system should be hosted at a remote site.  It would be easier to write a 
self contained program to run at the location of an operational unit, but the ability 
to review and compare data for various locations by anyone with authorization is 
far too valuable to sacrifice.  Centralized control also allows for more efficient 
storage and updating, and a standardized reporting and calculation system.  In 
addition, centralization means that local units do not have to become proficient in 
the analysis and computing issues associated with maintaining a metrics 
program.  For these reasons we decided to develop a remote system similar to 
that of Butler (2005) that would collect data through a webpage, and then 
conduct all the data analyses (e.g., calculations of metrics) and analysis reporting 
via an NPS server hosting the system.  The system architecture is such that the 
database program stores the data and computes the metrics, while separate 
software components run the web based online collection form and the interface 
between this user interface and the database.  Three technical issues arose in 
remotely hosting our metrics calculation system.  The first problem was 
accessibility of an internet-based system by an afloat operational user that would 
have limited internet access while at sea.  The second problem was the 
protection of potentially sensitive mission data that was to be transmitted to the 
processing system.  The third problem was ensuring that the remote site 
development was in compliance with the Navy’s information technology (IT) 
guidelines so that it would dovetail with other Navy IT development efforts and be 
transferable from the research and development oriented NPS to an operational 
METOC center. 
The first and second problems were solved by putting the system on the 
SIPRNet.  This allowed us to safely transmit sensitive mission data without the 
fear of compromise, and, since the SIPRNet is also used for quite a bit of other 
operational traffic by a CV, the SIPRNet is rarely inaccessible to OA divisions.   
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For the third problem we had to modify the software used in the Butler 
system.  Most of the work done by Butler (2005) and Darnell (2006) used open 
source software, such as PHP and MySQL, to develop a database and interface 
for data collection, analysis, and reporting.  The open source software they used 
is not cleared for use on operational computer systems in the military; but is 
allowed on developmental servers such as those at NPS.  But hosting the 
metrics system at NPS indefinitely would pose a problem because the METOC 
community would not have direct control over the system and unlimited access 
could not be guaranteed.  For this reason, we explored other options.  One 
option was to host the system at the Naval Atlantic Meteorology and 
Oceanography Command (NLMOC) on their SIPRNet servers.  This would 
provide the easiest access for members of SGOT Norfolk because it would be 
hosted in the same building as the SGOT command.  Hosting at NLMOC was 
determined to be non-feasible because of the IT requirements of the Navy 
precluded the software we were using.  NLMOC was bound by the Navy’s 
requirements and we were unable to develop our system on approved software 
due to the relatively high cost of licensing requirements.  Our second option was 
to target the system to be hosted at the Fleet Numerical Meteorology and 
Oceanography Command (FNMOC).  FNMOC hosts most of the Navy’s 
numerical weather models and computer-based research in the field of METOC 
modeling.  Because of this, they are able to run developmental servers that can 
host open source software.  They had already received approval for use of PHP 
in their development environment but had not received approval for MySQL, 
which had been used for the database in previous NPS METOC metrics projects.  
The approved open source software for databases was PostgreSQL.  So we 
adapted our database to run with the approved software.   
Our plan is to move our system, once fully developed, over to FNMOC.  
Hosting at FNMOC will allow us the METOC community to directly maintain the 
metrics system.  To facilitate the development of our system, we conducted 
much of the development on a publicly hosted Internet site.  We then migrated 
the system to an NPS SIPRNet site where small amounts of additional 
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development were conducted.  This NPS SIPRNet system is now being used to 
collect and analyze data from several OA divisions, and to report their metrics 
results to them.  We expect the system to be moved to an FNMOC site sometime 
in 2007.     
4. Data Collection Process 
The actual process of collecting data would ideally be a fully automated 
system that pulled observations from existing pilot reports and debriefing 
databases, and pulled forecast data from databases of mission forecasts.  The 
data collection would seamlessly integrate into the existing operational tempo of 
CV air operations.  The results would be instantly available for review and no 
extra man hours would be spent extracting data, entering data, or doing quality 
control of the data.  In practice, such databases are not widely used or integrated 
with each other.  Additionally, making entries into such databases without an 
expert on meteorological conditions present might frequently result in the severity 
of the weather events being misinterpreted.  The solution of how to get the data 
from the pilots to a database was to develop a paper form (see Figure 12) and 
set of instructions for use by OA division personnel to collect data before, during, 
and after pilot debriefings, and companion web based form into which METOC 
personnel would enter data from the paper form and make additional entries as 
needed.  The paper form and instructions are designed to be used by a METOC 
specialist in obtaining the mission data from the pilots.  The form allows for quick 
note taking and impact classification, and was much faster, more portable, and 
more flexible than data collection based only on a web based form would be.  
The paper form was taken to the intelligence debriefings of the pilots, and the 
debriefer, usually a forecaster or competent weather technician, would observe 
the debriefing conducted by the intelligence office.  Most of the information the 
weather debriefer needed was obtained from simply listening to the intelligence 
debriefing.  Any important parts of the weather picture that were not covered in 
the intelligence debriefing were quickly covered by a few questions from the 
weather debriefer to the pilot at the end of the intelligence debriefing.  This 
method of collecting data from the pilot provided a relatively complete set of data 
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on negative weather impacts during the mission while minimizing the time 
required of the pilot to provide that information.  After the debriefing, the weather 
debriefer took the paper form to the OA division office where it was entered into 
the electronic form on the SIPRNet at the convenience of the division. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Once we had started collecting data, we were ready to calculate metrics 
based on that data.  We calculated metrics that allowed us to assess the quality 
of the forecasts and their contribution to the situational awareness of the pilots.  
Three main categories of metrics were used.  The first type was forecast 
performance metrics that were designed to describe the quality of the forecast.  
The second type of metric was operational impacts metrics, used to describe 
how information in the forecast and the actual weather phenomena experienced 
during the mission affected or could have affected operations.  The third type of 
metric used in this study was phenomena metrics; these relate individual weather 
phenomenon to forecast performance and impacted operations.  For all of the 
metrics, our focus was on situations that were forecasted to, or actually did, have 
severe negative impacts on the missions (e.g., the performance of the forecasts 
in predicting phenomena with severe negative impacts). 
1. Forecast Performance Metrics 
The forecast performance metrics are based on the contingency table in 
Figure 11 and are used to describe the performance of the forecasts in predicting 
events with the potential to cause significant negative impacts to operations.  
Although these metrics are flexible and can be used for any chosen threshold, 
we have used the threshold between moderate impact and severe impact as 
defined by the operational personnel.  We will refer to a forecast of conditions 
above the threshold as a forecast for “severe impact” and a forecast for 
conditions below the threshold as a forecast for “no severe impact.”  Note that 
the forecasts with which we were dealing were not predictions of impacts but 
rather predictions of conditions that, based on established thresholds, would 
likely lead pilots to infer severe negative impacts from the forecasts.  Also, 
sometimes we have shortened the term “no severe negative impact” to “no 
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impact,”, but both terms mean the same thing: the impact of the forecasted 
weather was expected to be less than severe, i.e., no impact or moderate impact.  
We calculated four basic performance metrics that are outlined in the following 
sections.  
a. Forecast Accuracy Metric 
The forecast accuracy (FAC) metric compares the number of 
correct forecasts in a given category to the total number of forecasts in a given 
category (Hinz 2004) and gives the result as a percentage of correct forecasts.  
In relation to the standard contingency table, the calculation is given as: 
FAC 100 A D
A B C D
+= × + + +  
A perfect FAC score would then be 100% if every forecast for 
severe impacts and for no severe impacts was correct.  A serious drawback to 
this metric is evident when it is used to measure a forecaster’s accuracy on 
predicting rare events.  If, as illustrated in Table 1, a particular event occurs in 
3% of forecast periods, a forecaster could maintain a 97% FAC simply by never 
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Total 0 100 100 
 
Table 1.   Contingency table completed to demonstrate how a forecaster could 






b. Probability of Detection Metric 
The probability of detection (POD) metric serves as a useful 
complement to FAC, because it accounts for a failure to forecast rare events.  
POD compares the number of times a type of event was correctly predicted with 
the number of times that type of event was observed (Hinz 2004) using the 
following equation:  
POD 100 A
A B
= × +  
POD shows us how good forecasters are at predicting a particular 
type of event.  A score of 100% would mean that the forecaster correctly 
predicted the event every time it was observed.  Note that a high POD score 
tends to be hard to get for rare impacts.  By including the POD for rare events as 
a forecast performance metric, forecasters are discouraged from ignoring rare 
events in an attempt to get a higher FAC score.  However, a POD score can be a 
misleading skill indicator if the forecaster has a tendency to over-forecast a 
certain type of event.  Take the example in Table 2 of 100 forecasts where 40 of 
them are a correct forecast for a severe impact (A in the contingency table), 20 
are incorrect severe impact forecasts (C), zero are for incorrect no severe impact 
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Total 60 40 100 
 
Table 2.   Contingency table completed to demonstrate how a forecaster could 
maintain a high POD by over forecasting for an event. 
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In this example the FAC would be 80%, and the POD would be an impressive 
100%.  The problem is that even though all the observed severe impacts were 
correctly forecasted, 33% of the severe impact forecasts were incorrect.  Even 
though the POD and FAC numbers were rather good, a reasonable perception 
by the customer who received the many extra severe impacts forecasts that 
never came to fruition might be that the forecasters hedge their bets to stay on 
the safe side. 
c. False Alarm Rate Metric 
The false alarm rate (FAR) metric indicates the rate at which a 
forecaster predicts severe impacts that are not observed and serves as a final 
partner to FAC and POD.  FAR compares the number of incorrect forecasts of an 




= × +  
The FAR calculation gives the percentage of severe impact 
forecasts that are incorrect.  A FAR score of 0% would indicate that no severe 
impact forecasts were incorrect, and a high FAR score could indicate that the 
forecaster was over forecasting a severe impact.  When combined with POD, a 
more complete picture can be formed about the forecaster’s skill (Hinz 2004).  A 
high POD and low FAR would indicate that a forecaster was skilled at accurately 
forecasting a particular type of severe impact.  A low POD and high FAR would 
indicate that a forecaster was having trouble forecasting for a specific impact 
because they were missing impacts that were observed and predicting impacts 
that were not observed.  Finally, a low POD and low FAR would mean the 
forecaster was under forecasting the impact, and a high POD and high FAR 
would mean the forecaster was over forecasting the impact. 
d. Bias Metric 
A more concise way to determine under and over forecasting is 
through the use of a bias calculation.  Bias compares all severe impact forecasts 
to all severe observations in the following calculation: 
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Bias 100 A C
A B
+= × +  
The bias calculation gives the percentage of observed severe 
impacts that were forecasted.  A score of 100% would be a neutral bias and 
would indicate that there were an equal number of forecasted impacts and 
observed impacts.  It does not necessarily mean that the forecasted and 
observed impacts correlated with each other.  A bias score of 125% would 
indicate that there were 25% more forecasted impacts than observed impacts, 
and that there is a tendency to over forecast the particular impact.  One problem 
with this definition of bias is that a given difference between the number of 
forecasts (A+C) and the number of observed events (A+B) can lead to very large 
differences in the magnitude of the bias, depending on which is larger.  Tables 3 
and 4 provide an example of this by showing the bias results when the difference 
between the number of forecasts and the number of observations is 80.  In the 
first case (Table 3), A+C = 10 and A+B = 90, leading to a bias of 11%.  In the 
second case, A+C=90 and A+B = 10, leading to a bias of 900%.  So although the 
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Total 10 90 100 
Table 3.   Contingency table completed to demonstrate how an under-bias of 11% 
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Total 90 10 100 
Table 4.   Contingency table completed to demonstrate how an over-bias of 900% 
can be calculated.  
 
To address this shortcoming, we have developed a modified bias 
calculation that centers the bias score on zero and uses two different calculations 
depending on whether there is an over or under forecasting bias.  For an under 
forecast bias, where (A+C) < (A+B) the following calculation would be used: 
Bias ( 1) 100 100 A C
A B
+= − × − × +  
For an over forecast bias, where (A+C) > (A+B) the following calculation would 
be used: 
Bias 100 100 A B
A C
+= − × +  
This modified version of the bias metric allows an easier comparison of over and 
under forecast tendencies because values with an equal difference between the 
number of forecasts and the number of observations are represented by an 
equal, but opposite, tendency to over or under forecast an event.  In this version, 
a 0% bias is neutral, positive numbers indicate an over forecasting bias and 
negative numbers indicate an under forecasting bias. 
2. Operational Impacts Metrics 
The second category of metrics calculations are operational impacts 
metrics that represent how the mission was affected by the forecast or by the 
weather events encountered during the mission.  We used metrics similar to 
those used by Jarry (2005) and Butler (2005), in particular, metrics similar to the 
missions saved metric.  These metrics describe how a forecast for adverse 
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conditions that led to a mitigation recommendation affected the mission planning.  
Because the OA division does not typically make recommendations that affect 
mission planning we did not calculate the missions saved or weapons saved 
metrics.  However, we were able to create some metrics based on similar 
concepts, as outlined in the rest of this section. 
a. Received Negative Metric 
The missions that received a negative impact forecast (received 
negative) metric is the number of missions forecasted to have a severe impact 
divided by the total number of missions.  This metric shows the percentage of all 
missions for which pilots were warned about a severe impact.    
b. Mitigated Received Negative Metric 
Based on the missions potentially saved metric in Butler (2005), we 
developed a similar metric, the missions that received a negative impact forecast 
and took mitigating action in response to encountering negative phenomena 
metric, which we simplified to: the mitigated received negative metric.  This 
metric is based on the same calculation as the missions potentially saved metric, 
with the exception that there was no mitigating action recommended by the 
forecaster.  The need for mitigating action is implied by the forecast of negative 
impacts.  The calculation is done by totaling the number of missions with a 
correctly forecasted severe impact and a mitigating action by the pilot due to that 
impact divided by total number of missions.  This metric provides a measure of 
the accuracy of the SA given to the pilot by the forecasters.   
The negative received metric indicates the percentage of times that 
forecasters warned pilots of severe negative impacts.  The mitigated received 
negative metric indicates the percentage of times that the forecaster warnings 
were correct.  Thus, the closer the two metrics are to each other, the better the 
forecasters are doing in providing accurate SA to the pilots about severe 
negative impacts.  These forecasts used in the calculation of the mitigated 
received negative metric can be seen as those that would tend to increase 
forecaster credibility.  The forecasts of severe negative impacts that do not go 
into this calculation (i.e., those that are incorrect) would tend to decrease 
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forecaster credibility.  The other type of forecast error that erodes credibility, that 
of forecasting no impact, or moderate impact, when severe impacts ultimately 
occur, was not calculated or considered in this study, but is obtainable from the 
data we collected. 
c. Missions Placed at Risk Metric 
The missions placed at risk metric is the percentage of total 
missions flown for which pilots encountered severe negative weather impacts 
during mission execution.  The metric is independent of the forecasted impacts 
and gives the user of the metric an idea how weather impacted missions flown 
during the data collection period. 
d. Mitigation Rate Metric 
The mitigation rate metric is the percentage of the total number of 
missions in which pilots took mitigating action in response to severe negative 
weather impacts.  This metric gives an overall picture of how weather led to 
mitigating actions.   
e. Missions Requiring Mitigation Metric 
The missions requiring mitigation metric is the percentage of 
missions that encountered severe negative weather impacts for which mitigating 
actions were taken due those impacts.  This metric is similar to the mitigation 
rather but is based on a subset of all missions, rather than all missions.  Pilots 
are not always able to take mitigating actions in response to the severe negative 
weather impacts they encounter.  For example, air space constraints above the 
planned flight level, and enemy threats below that level, may prevent a pilot from 
avoiding negative impacts from turbulence at the planned flight level.  Or, as 
another example, the requirements of combat may make a mission a must fly 
mission despite severe negative impacts (cf. Hinz 2004, Jarry 2005).  Thus, 
encountering a negative impact does not necessarily mean that mitigating action 
was taken.  So the missions requiring mitigation metric is useful in helping to 
distinguish the situations in which severe impacts were encountered and 
mitigating action was taken from the situations in which severe impacts were 
encountered but no mitigating action was taken.  
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f. Missions Canceled Metric 
The missions canceled metric represents the percentage of total 
missions that were cancelled due to severe impacts.  This metric is a subset of 
missions requiring mitigation metric that focuses on missions that were cancelled 
due to severe negative weather impacts. 
g. Targets Changed Metric 
The targets changed metric represents the percentage of total 
missions for which the target was changed due to severe impacts.  This metric is 
a subset of the missions requiring mitigation metric that focuses on missions that 
required a target change due to severe negative weather impacts. 
3. Impacting Phenomena Metrics 
The final category of metrics in this study is negatively impacting 
phenomena metrics.  These metrics are used to describe how specific weather 
phenomena impacted missions, independently of how well the impacts were 
forecasted.  These metrics are useful in determining the phenomena on which 
forecasters and pilots may need to focus extra effort; for example, extra effort in 
improving forecasts, mission planning, and pilot education and training (cf. Jarry 
2005, Butler 2005)   
a. Mission Impacting Phenomena Metrics 
The mission impacting phenomena metrics show the percentage of 
mission impacts due to individual weather phenomena.    
b. Mission Canceling Phenomena Metrics 
The mission canceling phenomena metrics show the percentage of 
mission cancellations due to individual weather phenomena.   
c. Target Changing Phenomena Metrics 
The target changing phenomena metrics show the percentage of 







In this chapter, we review the results of the implementation into the fleet of 
our metrics data collection, analysis, and reporting system.  We begin by 
evaluating the system we implemented, including the development of the data 
collection model, the data collection by the user, the value of the metrics 
calculations to the user, and the lessons learned in the development and 
implementation of our metrics system.  We then review the results of our data 
analyses, especially the forecast performance and operational impacts metrics.  
We also provide an assessment of what the metrics reveal about how the 
METOC community contributes to the Navy, what data still needs to be collected 
to have a more complete picture of METOC community contributions, and 
additional steps needed in the on-going metrics program of which this study is a 
part.  
B. SYSTEM RESULTS 
One of our goals with this project was to create and implement a system 
that collected forecasted and observational data and provided near real time 
metrics reports in text and graphical formats to the user.  To achieve this goal, 
we conducted a series of experiments to determine the best data to collect, the 
best way to conduct the data collection, and the best analyses and metrics to 
conduct, and the best reports to provide.   
The experiments included a series of trials and redesigns of our system as 
the system evolved into its final form for this study.  The first series of trials and 
changes occurred in the development of the data collection questions and forms.  
The second series of trials and changes occurred during the course of 
determining the best process for using the form to collect data on an operational 
CV.  The third series of trials and changes occurred in the development of the 
analysis tools and metrics calculations, and the reporting components.  Our final 
step was to assess our full development process to identify the major lessons we 
learned that should be considered in planning future METOC metrics work. 
42 
1. Implementation 
Implementing the metrics program took three steps.  The first step was to 
design a set of questions that could fit on a 1-2 page paper form and have the 
form assessed by an OA division for content, wording, and ease of use.  The 
second step was to develop an electronic form that closely resembled the paper 
form to allow for computer computations of collected data.  The final step was to 
run the electronic form through a test run with real operational data. 
Our first step in implementing a metrics system on an operation CV was to 
do a series of trials with paper forms.  Through a weekly conference call with 
CDR Woll and LCDR Schmeiser from SGOT Norfolk, Bruce Ford (a retired Navy 
METOC officer and contracted computer programmer), Dr. Tom Murphree (the 
head of the NPS METOC metrics program), and the author, we developed a 
series of paper forms for discussion and testing (Woll 2006, Schmeiser 2006, 
Ford 2006, Murphree 2006).  The original paper forms were used to test ideas on 
what information needed to be collected, what information could be collected, 
and how much information should be collected.  We applied many of the lessons 
learned by Butler (2005) on designing a data collection form and process, by 
Darnell (2006) on the length of the data collection form and the aircrew time 
required during data collection, and by Hinz (2006) on using the intelligence 
debriefings of pilots as important opportunities to collect data for METOC metrics 
analyses.  Early versions of the collection forms were distributed amongst the 
members of the conference call party for review.  The first version of the form 
came from the consensus of the conference call members, and the form reflected 
our original desire to collect data on mission planning forecasts along with 
mission execution forecasts.  The original data collection form can be seen in 
Figure 13. 
We did a trial of the first iteration of the paper data collection form with the 
OA division on the USS Enterprise for three weeks during a pre-deployment 
exercise in early 2006.  From this first trial, we learned that our form did not align 
well with how operations were conducted onboard the CV.  Many fields of the 
form were left blank due to the lack of a planning element on the CV.  A large 
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section of the form concentrated on collecting data from two forecasts, a planning 
forecast issued more than 12 hours prior to mission takeoff, and a mission 
execution forecast issued within 12 hours of takeoff.  However, since there was 
no planning element on the CV that received an OA division planning forecast, 
there was no data to collect regarding a planning forecast or mitigations based 
on a planning forecast.  Additionally, we included many questions on the initial 
form regarding air wing initiated mitigations during mission planning, but learned 
that the air wing planners had very limited mitigation capability.  Most mitigating 
actions were made by the pilot during mission execution, and we asked very few 
questions regarding these pilot initiated mitigating actions.   
We took the lessons learned from the trial of our first paper form and 
developed a second paper form that can be seen in Figure 12. The second 
iteration of the paper form, as described in Chapter II, focused only on the 
mission execution forecasts and impacts experienced by the pilot.  This second 
iteration of the form collected data on the forecasted severe impacts, severe 
impacts observed by the pilots, and mitigating actions taken by the pilots.    This 
second form went through several stages before it was tested.  Originally it was 
set up to track in what phase of the mission each severe impact and mitigating 
action was experienced.  This proved to be very cumbersome and led us to 
believe it would be a daunting form to complete by the mission debriefer and a 
code intensive form to put onto a SIPRNet site.  A version of the second form 
was presented to the OA division of the USS Enterprise.  Feedback from the 
second iteration was much more encouraging (Everett 2006).  A few changes 
were suggested by the OA division and the participants in the weekly conference 
calls.  This paper form ended up being the form we then used to develop the 
electronic data collection form. 
The electronic form was developed to parallel the final paper form.  The 
electronic collection form consisted of the same questions as the paper form in 
the same basic layout to allow for easy transfer of the paper form data onto the 
SIPRNet.  The electronic data collection form can be seen in Figures 14 and 15 
and on the SIPRNet at http://web.ntsstl.nps.navy.smil.mil/Metrics/ 
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shipboard_metrics/strike_metrics/index.php as of 22 September 2006.  We found 
it beneficial to develop the electronic form on the internet before placing it on the 
SIPRNet.  Developing it on the internet allowed for easier interaction with civilian 
contractors and convenient access for all parties that were reviewing the system.  
Having the electronic form developed on the internet also allowed us to populate 
the database with a large amount of test data inputted by civilian staff from NPS.  
The test data was used to test the operational capabilities of the system, to 
develop our calculations and text and graphical reports using a dataset with 
prescribed properties.  Developing the calculations in this way allowed us to hand 
check our calculation against the computer calculations without having to 
contend with a real-time, changing database.  One of the problems we 
encountered during our initial test with the test data was that the PostgreSQL 
database software was very slow at completing the many calculations involving 
nested loops.  We felt this would become a liability once large amounts of 
operational data were collected.  During the development of the metrics 
calculations, we decided it would be more efficient to have the PostgreSQL 
database software only collect and store data, and to have the PHP interface 
software do the analysis calculations. 
Once the data collection form and database were functioning on our 
development internet site, the system was replicated at the NPS METOC Metrics 
program SIPRNet site.  While developing the analysis and reporting functions of 
our system, we started collecting data from two operational CVs.  The USS 
Enterprise and the USS Eisenhower both participated in small scale collections in 
August of 2006 that helped us assess access to the system from operating CVs 
and the usability of the system to new OA divisions with little or no prior 
knowledge of our program or online system.  Overall feedback indicated that the 
system was accessible and functional.  Data could be entered in via the SIPRNet 
form and archived on the hosting server at NPS with no complications. 
2. Interaction 
The OA divisions that participated in the August 2006 trial of the electronic 
form reported favorable opinions of the online system.  The divisions reported 
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that the questions asked of the pilots and the information collected provided an 
adequate representation of what the pilots experienced (Everett, 2006).  The 
divisions also reported that they had adequate manpower to do the collections 
without having to overly strain personnel resources.  Additionally, the method of 
collecting data during the intelligence debriefing of the pilot proved successful 
and was generally considered the best practice for collecting mission data 
(Hinz,2006, Everett 2006).  Some of the mission debriefers also reported 
success debriefing individual pilots at times outside of the intelligence debriefing 
per the pilots’ individual preferences (Woll, 2006).  The OA divisions also noted 
that during August 2006, the weather in the ships’ operating areas was generally 
benign and that their feedback to us about using our system might change when 
weather conditions become more adverse and lead to an increase in the OA 
divisions’ workloads.  
The negative feedback we received from the August 2006 data collection 
effort all involved SIPRNet connectivity issues.  On several occasions, OA 
division members had trouble entering data into the online collection form 
because either they could not access the form hosted at NPS or because poor 
connectivity interfered with data submission.  We were unable to identify an 
immediate solution for the connectivity issues but have some ideas for future 
work (see chapter IV).  The best short term solution we could provided was for 
the OA division to archive their paper forms until SIPRNet connectivity improved 
and they were able to submit their data online.  Once we determined that the 
electronic collection form was well matched with the needs and abilities of the OA 
divisions, we focused our efforts on the data analysis and reporting components 
of the system. 
3. Data Analyses 
Butler (2005) and Darnell (2006) both developed automated data 
collection, analysis, and reporting systems.  Their systems allowed reports to be 
issued to users within seconds of data being entered.  This was much faster than 
the many months that prior studies, such as those from Jarry (2005) and Hinz 
(2004), needed to provide the same type of calculations.  Studies based on 
46 
automated real time analyses and on delayed analyses have provided useful 
metrics.  The delayed results studies have yielded historical analyses on 
missions that took place months to years in the past, whereas the near real time 
studies have provided current analyses of how the METOC community was 
supporting missions.  For our study, we adapted the systems developed by 
Butler (2005) and Darnell (2006) to help provide real time information on the 
performance of forecasts, the value of forecasts to pilots, and how missions are 
being affected by specific weather phenomena. 
We developed our set of metrics (Chapter II, Section B) from those in prior 
near real time studies.  We only made slight, customer specific changes to most 
of the prior metrics.  The metrics in this set were chosen to give an accurate real 
time picture of the skill of forecasters, the value forecasts give to the mission, and 
what types of weather are affecting missions. 
Figures 16-32 show examples of the output from our automated real time 
system using test data analyzed at the internet development site.  We used test 
data and an unclassified internet system development site to error check our 
data analyses, and our text and graphical outputs, prior to moving the system to 
the SIPRNet site.  These output examples using test data are representative of 
the classified output available on the SIPRNet.  The metrics output is displayed in 
tabular, graphical, and text formats, and shows the individual values based on 
type of weather impact, phase of the mission, and averages of impacts and/or 
phases.  The output formats were selected based on recommendations from a 
range of METOC personnel. Classified output from the SIPRNet version of the 
system using real world operational data is available in the classified Appendix of 
this report and at the NPS METOC metrics SIPRNet site 
(http://web.ntsstl.nps.navy.smil.mil/Metrics/shipboard_metrics/strike_metrics/inde
x.php). 
Figures 16–25 show output examples from the forecast performance 
metrics: FAC, POD, FAR and bias.  Examples of operational impacts metrics 
based on test data are shown in Figures 26 and 27.  As discussed in Chapter II, 
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Section B.2, the received negative metric and the mitigated received negative 
metric are based on the concept of missions saved developed by Jarry (2005) 
and missions potentially saved developed by Butler (2005).  Examples of output 
for the impacting phenomena metrics are shown in Figures 28-32.  The primary 
challenges in developing the process for generating real time displays of the 
three different types of metrics (forecast performance, operational impact, and 
impacting phenomena) was refining just what the metrics should represent, and 
how they should be calculated from the data collected using the forms shown in 
Figures 12, 14-15.  This was especially true for the operational impacts metrics.  
Our secondary challenge was to realistically create the graphical outputs in an 
automated manner. 
4. System Lessons Learned 
Several lessons were learned from the development of the metrics 
system.  These lessons mainly became evident during the trials of the paper and 
electronic data collection processes.  We feel these lessons are not unique to 
working with OA divisions on CVs, but have wide application in developing many 
types of METOC metrics systems.  Specifically, we learned the following. 
• Prior to designing a system, it is critical to do a thorough assessment of 
the processes used, and not used, by the METOC unit’s customers, and 
by the METOC unit itself.  In our case, we spent much more time on this 
task then we anticipated needing.  We did not initially know that CV air 
wings have essentially no mission planning capability and very little pre-
mission mitigation capability.  Nor did we initially know that OA divisions 
do not usually provide planning weather forecasts.  Instead, the CAOCs 
tend to provide almost all of the mission planning and the planning 
forecasts.   We learned that the main benefit the OA division provides is 
weather situational awareness for pilots.  This required us to make some 
significant changes to our plans for collecting and analyzing data, in 
particular because SA is difficult to quantify and assess. 
• Getting the data we needed, especially getting data from pilots, was not as 
hard as we initially believed it would be.  We found that we were able to 
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glean most of the data we needed from the intelligence debriefing, and 
that the demand on the pilots’ time was not as large as we had expected.  
We attribute our success in collecting data to a combination of applying 
lessons learned from Darnell (2006) regarding asking for too much 
information, from Hinz (2006) regarding how to use intelligence 
debriefings of pilots to collect data, and the fact that CV operations 
required fewer questions than the missions on which Butler (2005) and 
Darnell (2006) based their data collection. 
• Development of the collection system on the Internet made the 
development process much more efficient.  Internet use allowed for 
civilian contractors to be involved in the programming of the system and 
allowed all parties to access the development system from non-secure 
computers, thus facilitating feedback. 
• The PostgreSQL database software struggled to compute the many 
calculations involving nested loops within a reasonable time, and was 
probably not the best software choice for this purpose.  During the 
development of the metrics calculations, we decided it would be more 
efficient to have the PHP interface software complete the calculations and 
have the PostgreSQL database software only collect and store data. 
• SIPRNet connectivity problems affected data transfer from the CVs to 
NPS.  Users reported that on several occasions they had trouble 
submitting mission information due to an intermittent SIPRNet connection.  
This occurred even though we designed a system that required relatively 
little data to be transferred per mission. 
Based on these lessons, we have developed suggestions for future METOC 
metrics efforts (see Chapter IV). 
C. METRICS RESULTS 
1. Results 
We were able to conduct an initial assessment of the METOC support 
given by one of the aircraft carriers in this study.  This CV provided a sufficient 
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amount of data for doing a very preliminary assessment of the performance and 
operational impacts of its forecasts.  Our initial assessment revealed gave results 
that were similar to those from Hinz (2004) and Jarry (2005).  These results 
include: a FAC for all forecasts of 99.4%, a POD for all forecasts of severe 
negative weather impacts of 40.0%; and a 13.6% mitigation rate.  The similarity 
between these metrics and those from prior studies suggest that our data 
collection, analysis, and reporting system is functioning as intended.  A more 
complete assessment of the performance and operational impacts of the OA 
division forecast will be possible once a larger quantity of data has been 
collected.  These assessments will be available at the NPS METOC metrics 
SIPRNet site in real time as the data is collected.  
2. Limited Data 
The metrics results we obtained in this study are based mainly on data 
from two CVs and from brief periods of time (August-September 2006 for most of 
the data).  Thus, our metrics results are not yet extensive enough to make well 
founded assessments of how well the OA divisions are doing or how CV 
missions are being affected by weather forecasts and phenomena.  But, as the 
metrics system we created is introduced to more operational units and used over 
a longer period of time, a larger dataset will be produced from which robust 
results can be generated.   
The time allowed for our collections ended up being mainly August -
September 2006.  The number of missions flown during this time was not high, 
and the weather conditions were very rarely adverse.  Thus, there were few 
missions that experienced severe negative weather impacts.  
The number of participating ships also limited our dataset.  The primary 
ship we collected from was the USS Enterprise while she was on her bi-annual 
deployment in the Middle East.  We collected data from the USS Eisenhower as 
its air wing participated in pre-deployment exercises and while the air-wing was 
training at NSAWC.  Finally, a small amount of data was collected from the air-
wing of the USS Stennis as it was training at NSAWC.  We did not attempt to 
extend our data collection beyond the aforementioned ships.  This is mainly 
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because of time constraints imposed by the deployment schedule for the CVs, 
and because our project was aimed at developing a well tested prototype 
system, not at collecting large amounts of data from many ships,  
3. Limited Metrics 
A side effect of the limited amount of data we were able to collect was the 
limited number of metrics we were able to compute.  The ability to accurately 
predict weather varies not only by forecaster and type of unit supported.  
Forecasting accuracy is also affected by regions, seasons, and climate 
variations.  Metrics that measured quality of forecasts in different geographical 
regions, seasons, and climate variations could be used to determine how these 
variables affect, for example, METOC contributions to its customers, and how to 
improve forecaster training.  In order to calculate metrics that describe spatial 
and temporal forecasting differences, more data must be collected.  The data 
must also be linked to the region in which it was collected, something we did not 
attempt to do in this study.  Once a large dataset is created, most likely over 
several years, a good understanding of the spatial and temporal variations in 
forecast performance, operational impacts, and impacting phenomena can be 
developed.  The effects of slowly varying factors (e.g., El Nino, Pentagon budget 
variations, CONOPS variations, etc.) will require decades worth of data to be fully 
understood.   
4. Value 
One of our goals was to conduct an initial evaluation of the performance of 
METOC products provided in support of strike warfare and the operational 
impacts of those products on strike warfare.  Our dataset allowed for only a 
limited assessment of the quality of the products that were being provided to 
pilots in support of their missions, and we were only able to look at the METOC 
products provided to pilots, not those provided to mission planners.  Initially, we 
had hoped to be able to asses both types of products. 
To analyze planning products for CV missions, we would need to collect 
and analyze data from CAOCs (as was done by Hinz (2004)).  However, we 
determined that collecting and analyzing data on mission execution forecasts and 
51 
outcomes would be challenging in several respects, and that working with CAOC 
data would be beyond the scope of this study.  To complete the depiction of 
METOC support for Naval strike operations, future extensions of this study will 
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IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
We started this study with three goals (see Chapter I).  The first goal was 
to adapt the metrics collection and analysis system developed by Butler (2005) to 
operational use for strike warfare support.  We met this goal through the 
development of a SIPRNet based data collection, analysis, and report system.  
The second goal was the implementation of the metrics system on three 
operational aircraft carriers, which we achieved.  Our third goal was to conduct 
an initial evaluation of the accuracy and impact of METOC products provided in 
support of strike warfare.  This goal was also met, primarily in the form of our 
classified data analyses and reports. 
B. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
While striving to achieve our overall goals for the project we proceeded 
through six major phases.  Each phase was a necessary step toward the 
implementation of our intended metrics.   The phases were: 
1. Determination of METOC Support Focus Area 
The first step towards supporting aircraft carrier strike missions was to 
determine what aspect of strike operations we wanted to focus out efforts on.  
Developing a system that touched every aspect of carrier based strike operations 
would not have been feasible within our study.  Through initial trials and 
discussions, we focused our metrics efforts on mission execution forecasts given 
to carrier based pilots, the situational awareness those forecasts provided, and 
the mitigating actions pilots took due to the corresponding observed conditions. 
2. Dataset Development 
Specific data had to be identified for collection.  The data we collected had 
to be complete enough to make basic metrics calculations, and succinct enough 
that it could be reasonably extracted from pilot debriefings without imposing a 
burden on the pilots.  A short form was developed to collect data from pilots on 
severe negative weather impacts they encountered.  The key issues on which we 
sought data from the pilots and/or the OA personnel were: (1) the severe impacts 
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encountered during the mission; (2) the severe impacts that were forecasted; (3) 
how the severe impacts affected the mission; and (4) the mitigating action pilots 
took in response to the severe impacts.  We focused on severe negative weather 
impacts, even though they tend to be rare, because they are: (a) impacts pilots 
are likely to remember; (b) impacts that are most difficult to forecast; and (c) 
impacts that are critical to accurately forecast (cf. Hinz (2004), Jarry (2005)).  
Severe impact forecasts and observations were also well suited to binary 4x4 
contingency table analyses, one of the standard tools in forecast verification..  
3. Development of Metrics Analyses 
The studies outlined in Chapter I, Section B extended considerable effort 
in developing metrics to use in measuring METOC support to combat operations.  
We used many of the concepts they studied, and made some alterations along 
with developing several new metrics of our own.  Our performance metrics (FAC, 
POD, FAR, and bias) were all adapted for use in combat support in prior studies.  
We used the performance metrics unaltered, with the exception of bias which we 
retooled slightly for easier understanding by end users.  We also adapted the 
previously developed concepts of missions saved and missions potentially saved 
(Jarry 2005; Butler2005) and adapted them for use in an environment where no 
mitigating actions were recommended.  Finally, we used variations of many 
existing impacting phenomenon metrics and adapted them for tracking missions 
in which pilots took mitigating action during mission execution. 
4. Preliminary Analyses 
With the structure of the dataset and metrics calculations in place, we 
developed the online data collection, analysis, and reporting component of our 
system.  The system was initially developed on the internet for testing and 
revising.  While hosted on the internet we populated the developmental system 
with test data to check our metrics analysis and reporting processes, we solicited 
comments and ideas from parties involved in the development of the overall 




5. Implementation of a Highly Adaptable SIPRNet System 
Once the developmental system on the internet was approved, we placed 
the system on the SIPRNet for use by operational units.  The first operational run 
of the system consisted of three CVs collecting data from their missions and 
entering that data into the NPS SIPRNet database.  The data we collected dealt 
with four main issues: (1) the severe impacts encountered during the mission; (2) 
the severe impacts that were forecasted; (3) how the severe impacts affected the 
mission; and (4) the mitigating action pilots took in response to the severe 
impacts.  These questions and answer options we developed for these four 
issues are easily changed to meet the needs of other warfare areas without 
having to redevelop the programming code or retraining system operators and 
users.  Thus, the foundation component of our system, data collection, along with 
the supporting IT infrastructure, is highly adaptable.  
6. Feedback 
Once the operational collection system was in place, we were able to 
solicit feedback from METOC personnel that were using the system.  Their 
feedback was useful in fine-tuning the process of collecting mission data from the 
pilots.  The feedback from the users also showed us some of the shortcomings of 
the system, such as unreliable SIPRNet connectivity, that can be applied to 
future METOC metrics efforts. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
We learned lessons that should be applied to any future work in future 
METOC metrics efforts.  Our lessons came from two distinct parts of our project: 
the conceptual development phase and the transitioning to operational use 
phase. 
1. Conceptual Development 
During conceptual development we originally wanted to collect METOC 
metrics data and perform metrics calculations on forecasts and mitigating actions 
during the planning portions of a strike missions.  This would include weather 
support given to the ATO planners and changes made to the ATO up to forecasts 
given to pilots for mission execution and mitigating actions taken before and after 
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aircraft launch.  What we learned was that we did not have a good understanding 
of the process of moving a mission from the planning stages through execution.  
Our incomplete understanding cost us time and man-hours while we were trying 
to develop a system to collect data that did not exist within the framework of OA 
division METOC support.  Our take-away from the process was that we should 
have invested more initial project time and effort into fully understanding the 
process we were trying to track, and a complete understanding could have led to 
a better end product. 
The second lesson learned during the conceptual development was that 
the CAOC provides critical support to mission planners and pilots.  The METOC 
support given to ATO planners ultimately supports air wing pilots flying missions 
on the ATO.  To fully track the weather forecasts given to the pilot and all 
mitigating actions that affect a mission, a data collection, analysis, and reporting 
system must be created for and implemented in the CAOC. 
2. System Implementation 
The implementation of our data collection, analysis, and reporting system 
in CV operations also led to a series of lessons learned.  These lessons were 
outlined in Chapter III, Section B, and are reviewed here: 
• We found that we were able to glean most of the data we needed from the 
intelligence debriefing using a senior AG or a junior AG with a strong 
understanding of the strike mission process, and that the demand on 
pilots’ time was acceptable to the pilots.  Based on lessons learned from 
prior studies (Butler (2005), Darnell(2006), Hinz (2006)), we set out to 
minimize the impacts of our data collection on the pilots’ routine by 
integrating our collection into an existing debriefing rather asking pilots to 
participate in a new METOC focused debriefing. 
• Development of the collection system on the Internet made the process 
much more efficient.  Internet use allowed civilian contractors to readily be 
involved in the programming of the system, and allowed all parties to 
access the system from non-secure computers, thus facilitating feedback. 
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• The PostgreSQL database software had difficulty quickly computing the 
many metrics, and may not have been the best choice of software for this 
purpose.  We decided it would be more efficient to have the PHP interface 
software do the calculations and have the PostgreSQL database software 
only collect and store data. 
• Despite our efforts to require the least amount of data to be transferred 
through a remote site, and our use of the most available connection on the 
CV, we found that poor SIPRNet connectivity still affected data transfer.  
Users reported that on several occasions they had trouble submitting 
mission information due to intermittent SIPRNet connectivity. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first step to the continuation of the current metric program of collecting 
aircraft carrier strike mission data is the transfer of our system to an operational 
METOC center for continued hosting and maintenance.  The server at NPS was 
always considered a developmental host and was not intended to be used 
indefinitely.  Access to the server is limited and the manpower at NPS cannot 
support maintenance of the system.  Personnel at an operational METOC center 
need to be trained on the operation of the system and how to maintain it for 
future use.  Hosting it at such a center will ensure prolonged data collection and 
establishment of a long term dataset with which to represent the quality of 
support Navy METOC gives to its operational customers.   One prime candidate 
center is FNMOC. 
Our METOC metrics system, along with the prior systems that were 
developed by Butler (2005) and Darnell (2006), was developed with a bottom-up 
approach.  The idea for it originated at an operational unit in the Navy and its 
design was dictated by those who would be using the system, especially those 
who would be analyzing the results.  The concept of developing a system to 
collect METOC support data and provide metrics results is supported by CNMOC 
leadership, but is not yet directed by them.  This study adds to an extensive set 
of studies on the reasons for, and means to, a comprehensive METOC metrics  
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program.  The net results of these studies clearly indicate the need for a 
governing body of the METOC community to develop a directed and 
standardized METOC metrics program.   
Under direction from CNMOC, the results of our project should be adapted 
for use in other warfare areas.  Most work in the field of METOC support metrics 
up to this point have been concentrated on fixed wing aviation missions.  The 
concepts developed in this and past studies could be adapted to special warfare, 
amphibious assault, and even into the realm of oceanography support for mine 
warfare and antisubmarine warfare.  The methods and infrastructure we have 
developed are highly adaptable to other warfare areas.   
Beyond Navy METOC, other branches of the military can benefit from the 
results of our study.  We have already seen some success with the closely 
Darnell (2006) system in the Air Force.  The improvements we have made to the 
Darnell approach can readily yield additional benefits to AFW and the customers 
it supports.  Beyond the Navy and the Air Force, the Army and the Marine Corps 
use weather support in the planning of operations.  Larger scale operations might 
require a different approach than that used for individual aircraft missions.  But 
the basic methods and benefits to the user are the same: (1) efficient collection 
and analysis of data on (a) forecasts and verifying observations and (b) customer 
plans and outcomes; and (2) an understanding of: (a) how weather and weather 
support products are used in mission planning and execution and (b) how 
weather impacts operations. 
E. FUTURE WORK 
One of the major projects we recommend for future research and 
development is the creation of a metrics system that incorporates both the 
planning and execution portions of the mission process based on data collected 
at the CAOC.  We also recommend continuing the effort toward seamless 
integration of different METOC related data collection efforts.  Pulling forecasted 
data from a briefing generator would reduce the work done by the OA division by 
making the forecast data collection invisible to the operator.  Likewise, pulling 
observation data from existing intelligence databases would make the collection 
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of observational data invisible to the pilot and the OA division, and make the 
collection of the data needed for a community wide METOC metrics program 
much more efficient, and would lead to much more extensive data sets than 
would otherwise be possible.  Such an automated system would be of great 
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APPENDIX — FIGURES 
 
Figure 5.   From Hinz (2004).  FAC computed for a classified mission at a 
classified location.  Vertical axis indicated percentage of perfect values 
divided by 100, and horizontal axis indicates forecast taus.  Top panel is 
total accuracy, and the lower panels are for Red, Yellow, and Green 
forecasts accordingly.  Hinz used a Red/Yellow/Green forecast structure 
instead of the Severe/Not Severe structure of this study. 
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Figure 7.   From Jarry (2005).  15th Operational Weather Squadron Global Mobility 
Weather Flight FY2004 monthly and annual mean number of missions in 
2004 that took mitigating actions, estimated number of missions saved 
from weather delays, and estimated number of missions that took 





Figure 8.   Example of the first page of a standard strike mission weather briefing 
given to pilots in support of individual missions flown from a CV showing 






Figure 9.   Example of the second page of a standard strike weather briefing 
given to pilots in support of individual missions flown from a CV showing 













































Total A+C B+D A+B+C+D 
 
Figure 10.   Contingency table.  Forecasts are assigned to one of four categories in 
this table (A-D) according to the operational impact indicated by the 
forecasted conditions and verifying observed conditions.  The number of 
entries in each category, plus the sum of the entries in different groupings 
of the four categories, is used to calculate forecast performance metrics 






Figure 11.   Example of the paper data collection form that was used to collect 
post-mission data from the pilots for transfer to the online form at the NPS 
METOC metrics SIPRNet site.  The form was designed such that most of 
the data only needed to be entered when there was a forecasted and/or 
observed severe negative weather impact.  This allowed the form to be 





Figure 12.   Example of the original proposed paper data collection form.  The form 
proved to be inadequate due to the lack of mitigation recommendations 








Figure 13.   Snapshot of the online data collection form corresponding to the paper 
data collection form shown in Figure 12.  The online form was designed to 
be as similar to the paper form as possible.  The form also hides the 
individual weather impact fields until the user needs them resulting in a 




Figure 14.   Example of an expanded weather impact field from the online 
collection form.  The check boxes are in the same layout as the paper 





Figure 15.   Example of tabular output from the development site for FAC using test 
data, not real world data.  The actual results look similar but with real 
world operational data.  FAC is the percentage of the total number of 
forecasts that were correct.  100% is a perfect score.  The columns 
indicate the FAC at each phase for each impact, with the last column the 
total FAC for each impact.  The bottom row indicates the total FAC per 
mission phase, and the red number is the total FAC for all phases and 





Figure 16.   Example of graphical output from the development site for FAC using 
test data, not real world data.  The actual results look similar but with real 
world operational data.  The bars indicate the FAC for each mission phase 
and for all phases combined, based on all types of impacts.  For details, 




Figure 17.   Example of graphical output from the development site for FAC using 
test data, not real world data.  The actual results look similar but with real 
world operational data.  The bars indicate the FAC for each type of impact, 




Figure 18.   Example of tabular output from the development site for POD using 
test data, not real world data.  The actual results look similar but with real 
world operational data.  POD indicates the percentage of times an event 
happened that was forecasted to happen.  100% is a perfect score.  The 
columns indicate the POD at each phase for each impact, with the last 
column showing the total POD for each impact.  For details, see Chapter 




Figure 19.   Example of graphical output from the development site for POD using 
test data, not real world data.  The actual results look similar but with real 
world operational data.  The bars indicate the POD for each mission 
phase and for all phases combined, based on all types of impacts.  For 




Figure 20.   Example of tabular output from the development site for FAR using test 
data, not real world data.  The actual results look similar but with real 
world operational data.  FAR is an indication of the percentage of times an 
event was incorrectly forecasted to happen.  Zero is a perfect score.  The 
columns indicate the FAR at each phase for each impact, with the last 
column total FAR for each impact.  The bottom row is the total FAR per 




Figure 21.   Example of graphical output from the development site for FAR using 
test data, not real world data.  The actual results look similar but with real 
world operational data.  The bars indicate the FAR for each mission phase 
and for all phases combined, based on all types of impacts.  For details, 




Figure 22.   Example of graphical output from the development site for FAR using 
test data, not real world data.  The actual results look similar but with real 
world operational data.  The bars indicate the FAR for each type of impact, 




Figure 23.   Example of tabular output from the development site for bias using test 
data, not real world data.  The actual results look similar but with real 
world operational data.  Bias is an indication of a  tendency to over-
forecast or under-forecast a type of event.  Zero is a perfect score.  
Positive scores indicate over-forecasting and negative scores indicate 
under-forecasting.  The columns indicate the bias at each phase for each 
impact, with the last column the total bias for each impact.  For details, 




Figure 24.   Example of graphical output from the development site for bias using 
test data, not real world data.  The actual results look similar but with real 
world operational data.  The bars indicate the bias for each type of impact, 




Figure 25.   Example of graphical operational impacts output from the 
developmental site using test data, not real world data.  The actual results 
look similar but with real world data.  The bars indicate the received 
negative metric (indicating the percentage of mission in which the pilots 
received a negative impact) and the mitigated received negative metric 
(indicating the percentage of missions that received a negative impact 
forecast and the pilot took mitigating action in response to encountering 




Figure 26.   Example of the operational impacts graphic output from the 
developmental site.  The actual results look similar but with operational 
data.  The graph indicates the percentage of total missions that were 
affected by weather, had a mitigating action due to weather, that were 




Figure 27.   Example of the mission canceling phenomenon output from the 
developmental site.  The actual results look similar but with operational 
data.  The graph shows the percentage of cancelled missions that were 





Figure 28.   Example of the target changing phenomenon output from the 
developmental site.  The actual results look similar but with operational 
data.  The graph shows the percentage of missions with target changes 




Figure 29.   Example of the mission impacting phenomenon output from the 
developmental site.  The actual results look similar but with operational 
data.  The graph shows the percentage of total observed severe impacts 




Figure 30.   Example of textual output from the development site using test data, 
not real world data.  The actual results look similar but with real world 
data.  The text outputs show the same results as in the operational 




Figure 31.   Continuation of Figure 30. 
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